

Supply or Demand? Migration and Political Manipulation in Mexico

Francisco Javier Aparicio (Political Studies Division, CIDE)

javier.aparicio@cide.edu

Covadonga Meseguer (International Studies Division, CIDE)

covadonga.meseguer@gmail.com

July 2011

Please do not cite without the authors' permission

Abstract

Collective remittances are the money flows sent by hometown associations (HTAs) of Mexican migrants to the US to their communities of origin. In Mexico, the 3 x 1 Program for Migrants matches by three the amounts that HTAs send back to their localities to invest in public projects. In previous research, we found that municipalities ruled by the party of the federal government were more likely to participate in the Program. The political bias in participation and fund allocation may stem from two possible mechanisms: HTAs' decisions to invest in some municipalities but not in others may reflect migrants' political preferences (a demand-driven bias). Alternatively, government officials may use the Program to finance their own political objectives (a supply-driven bias). To determine which of these two mechanisms is at work, we studied a 2 x 2 matrix of statistically selected cases of high-migration municipalities in the Mexican state of Guanajuato. We carried out over 60 semi-structured interviews with state and municipal Program administrators, local politicians, and migrant leaders from these municipalities. Our qualitative study indicates that migrant leaders are clearly pragmatic and that the political bias found is driven by elected officials strategically using the Program. The bias in favour of political strongholds is reinforced by the Program's requirements for cooperation among different levels of government. This study casts doubt about the effectiveness of public-private partnerships as valid formulas to reduce political manipulation. It also questions the ability of matching grant programs to reach the areas where public resources are most needed.

Keywords: Migration, Collective Remittances, 3x1 Program, Hometown Associations, Distributive Politics, Mexico.

*A previous draft of this paper was delivered at the *Midwest Political Science Association Conference*, Chicago, March 31-April 3, 2011. We thank the participants at CIDE/RI Seminar, Gerardo Maldonado, and Joy Langston for their comments and suggestions. We also thank CIDE and the MacArthur Foundation for funding the fieldwork for this paper. Nuty Cárdenas provided fantastic research assistance. Adriana Cortés kindly hosted us in Irapuato. Authors appear listed in alphabetical order.

Supply or Demand? Migration and Political Manipulation in Mexico

1. Introduction

Remittances in general and remittances sent by hometown associations (HTAs) in particular have recently attracted the attention of policymakers in developing countries. Given the absolute and relative weight of remittances in such countries (World Bank 2006; OECD 2007), these flows are believed to have a great potential to promote community-driven development. Parallel to this phenomenon, policymakers have introduced specific policies to sustain the flow of remittances and to influence the way in which they are used (Spector and de Graauw 2006; Adida and Girod 2011).

The Mexican 3 x 1 Program for Migrants is one such policy. Indeed, it is usually treated as an international reference in the cooperation between international diasporas and their communities of origin (World Bank 2006; Fernández, García and Vila 2006). The Program matches each dollar sent by HTAs of Mexican migrants to the US to finance local projects with one extra dollar from municipal, state, and federal governments. Typical projects include electrification, water, road paving and maintenance, housing infrastructure, educational and health projects, and town beautification. Since 2002, and following the impulse of the ruling Partido de Acción Nacional (PAN), the Program has been implemented at the federal level. Today, it involves more than 1,000 HTAs. Like any other public policy, the Program may be used for party political purposes. The involvement of the three levels of government (municipal, state, and federal) as well as of migrants themselves raises coordination problems that may benefit some political parties at the expense of others. Besides, the collusion of state and municipal governments may be used to benefit partisan strongholds or to target politically competitive localities.

In previous empirical work, we found that municipal strongholds governed by the party of the presidency were more likely to participate in the Program than their counterparts in the opposition. Our statistical regression analysis provided evidence of a significant association between political variables and fund allocation by the Program; but to precisely explain the mechanisms underlying these correlations, a more qualitative approach is required.

The political bias that we found might be the result of the political strategies of federal, state, and municipal politicians deliberately seeking to benefit PAN municipalities – a supply-driven bias. Alternatively, if migrants and HTAs are more likely to propose projects in PAN localities, then the observed bias might actually be driven by migrants’ political preferences – a demand-driven bias.

To determine which of these two possible mechanisms is at work, we conducted fieldwork in four municipalities in the state of Guanajuato and in the state of Zacatecas. We used a propensity score matching procedure to identify a 2 x 2 matrix of municipalities where we carried out more than 60 semi-structured interviews. During the summer and the fall of 2010, we interviewed local politicians, state and municipal Program operators, and migrant leaders in these four municipalities and in Dallas, Texas.

Our findings can be summarized as follows. First, the interviews established the central role of municipalities in promoting migrant organizations and therefore Program participation. This finding questions the characterization of this Program as driven by the demand of migrants. Second, migrant leaders are mostly pragmatic and non-partisan. Therefore, the political bias found in the statistical and qualitative evidence is supply-driven. And third, the supply-driven bias privileges electoral strongholds. Interestingly, we find that this is a way to reduce transaction costs as much as it is a deliberate political strategy.

These findings are relevant to several theoretical debates. In the first place, from the point of view of the distributive politics literature, we are interested in exploring the sort of political biases that are more likely to arise when policymakers do not exercise a complete monopoly over resources. Contrary to other public and social programs, the public–private character of this policy requires active cooperation among municipalities, HTAs, and local beneficiaries. This has consequences for the expected type of political discretion that it is most likely to be exercised. We posit that the bias in favour of partisan strongholds that we find in the statistical tests is as much a political strategy for rewarding loyal voters as it is the side effect of a policy design with high cooperation demands. Interestingly, introducing private actors into the making of this policy does not eliminate political manipulation. Instead, multiple decision-making levels shape the type of bias that it is most likely to be found favoring electoral strongholds.

Second, this paper contributes to the recent and growing literature that studies the political impact of migration in countries with high levels of outmigration (Bravo 2007; Pfutze 2007; Goodman and Hiskey 2008; Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow 2010; Burgess 2010). Scholars report decreasing levels of political engagement among those left behind with connections to migrants, remittances being one of those connections. This finding brings into question the claim that the migrants' experience in their democratic host countries may exert a virtuous influence when they return home (Levitt 1998). We find that policy interventions supposedly designed to target collective remittances toward developmental purposes are politically biased. The provision of public goods under the 3 x 1 Program serves to reward partisan strongholds regardless of the objective needs of these localities. This finding crucially brings into question whether migrants' involvement in their communities via this type of intervention helps to improve local governance and development.

The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we provide a background of the 3 x 1 Program, summarize previous empirical findings, and discuss our hypotheses. In section 3, we describe the empirical strategy and explain the case selection strategy. In section 4, we present the findings of our fieldwork, distinguishing two different moments in the decision-making process: first, we study the relationship between migrants, their localities, and municipalities, in both participating and non-participating municipalities. Second, we move up the ladder in the decision-making process to explore how decisions take place at the state and the federal levels. Section 5 concludes with the theoretical and the policy implications of this study.

2. Program background and hypotheses

Mexico has actively promoted its relationships with its diaspora. Although the engagement with migrants dates back to the 1980s, consular activity and official programs to assist migrants abroad have multiplied since the 1990s. In 1997 Mexico allowed its citizens to have dual nationality. In 2006 Mexicans abroad were allowed to vote in the presidential election. From 2002, under the US–Mexico Partnership for Prosperity Program, Mexicans could use the so-called *matrícula consular* to open bank accounts in the United States and transfer money, regardless of their legal migration status. And state and federal administrations have courted the Mexican diaspora, seeking its help in improving the living conditions of its communities of origin (Goldring 2002; Burgess 2005; Alarcón 2006; Spector and De Grauw 2006; World Bank 2006; Fernández, García, and Vila 2006; Iskander 2010).

The purpose of the 3 x 1 Program for Migrants is to increase the coverage and the quality of basic social infrastructure in localities that suffer from poverty or social backwardness or that experience high levels of emigration. In theory, it follows the investment initiatives of migrants living abroad (Soto and Velázquez 2006). The Program also aims to strengthen the links between

migrants and their communities through collaborative development projects and the organization of migrants abroad. When the *panista* Vicente Fox came to power in 2000, he set up the Institute for Mexicans Abroad, and gave impulse to the matching-grant Program with federal support. The 3 x 1 Program–Citizen Initiative started in 2002. In 2005 it became the 3 x 1 Program for Migrants. Under the pressure of Zacatecan migrant federations, this version restricted Program participation to migrant associations only (as opposed to any interested citizen).

Although collective remittances are smaller than total individual remittances, the Program is crucial for many municipalities where HTAs' money can supplement the meager finances of local governments (Goldring 2002; Valenzuela 2006). Thus, migrants have been actively courted by municipal and state politicians seeking to obtain extra resources for municipal public works.

Figure 1 illustrates the different actors involved in the 3 x 1 Program, and summarizes the different steps in the process leading to successful participation. The Mexican Ministry of Social Development (SEDESOL) and state representatives promote the Program among migrants and in the municipalities. In turn, municipalities establish contacts with localities and their HTAs. Migrant HTAs propose a particular project through the municipality to be carried out in their locality. Very frequently, local beneficiaries of projects also contribute with their own funds or work, and therefore they are important actors. They also take responsibility for the supervision of projects via mirror clubs (Fox and Bada 2008: 448).

In the *localities*, the delegate is a crucial actor. Delegates are representatives elected in community assemblies shortly after the municipal president takes office. Although they do not explicitly run under particular party labels, we observed that delegates' political leanings were common knowledge. Delegates are important actors because very frequently they act as intermediaries between migrants (and their representatives in the locality) and the municipality. As the current municipal president in Tarimoro put it, the municipality gives information to the

delegates and then the delegates disseminate this information in the communities.¹ Delegates help to identify clubs and intervene as mediators and facilitators.²

Every project has to be approved by state Committees of Validation and Attention to Migrants (COVAMs), also depicted in Figure 1. COVAMs exist in each state. They include three representatives of each of the four actors involved (migrants via HTAs, municipal, state, and federal governments via SEDESOL), for a total of 12 members. A COVAM decides by majority vote which projects are to be funded. In most cases, each of the four actors involved contributes 25 percent of the total cost of the approved project, albeit the financial mix can vary somewhat.

Each project application has to include a technical file assessing its viability, showing, for instance, that it has the necessary permits. The technical file is typically drafted by the municipality. On being submitted to the state offices, it is evaluated along with the project's compliance with the rules of operation. If the file is deemed to be not technically viable or if it contravenes the rules of operation, it is returned to the municipality and is not submitted to the COVAM meeting. SEDESOL does not keep such a thing as a systematic record of these returned files. Once a project is technically validated, it is put to the vote in the state COVAM, which may approve it with a majority of the votes. In Mexican states ruled by the PAN, with partisan collusion between the state and the federal government, only one more vote from a mayor or an HTA is needed to obtain a majority of votes in favour of a project. On the other hand, if the state is not ruled by the PAN, the federal government would find it more difficult to build a winning coalition in favour of its preferences.

*** Figure 1 about here ***

In a previous paper based on a panel data set of the 3 x 1 Program for over 2,400 municipalities in the 2002–2007 period, we explored the political economy of the Program (Authors, in press). Since the funding of projects is not granted according to any pre-established formula, or in light of any observable criterion other than the technical viability of the proposals, the Program is open to political manipulation. Moreover, the involvement of the three levels of government (municipal, state, and federal), as well as of migrants, raises cooperation problems that may benefit some political parties or localities at the expense of others.

Our previous empirical analyses revealed that municipalities in states ruled by the PAN were more likely to participate in the Program than their Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) and the Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD) counterparts (see model 1 in Table A1 in the Appendix). Similarly, municipalities with greater PAN electoral support were also more likely to participate. In other words, PAN strongholds have a greater probability of participating in the Program. This result holds even after we control for a number of predictors of Program participation such as population, migration, and poverty levels as well as for state and year effects.

As mentioned in the introduction, the political bias in favor of PAN strongholds that we found in the empirical analysis might be supply-driven – that is, the result of political manipulation by federal, state, and municipal politicians deliberately seeking to benefit PAN municipalities. Yet, if migrants and HTAs are more likely to propose projects in PAN localities, the observed bias might actually be demand-driven. Indeed, recent studies have suggested that migrants' demographic characteristics make them likely to hold anti-PRI political preferences (Bravo 2007). If this is the case, the mechanism behind our statistical finding would not be one of PAN politicians biasing the selection of projects in favor of their strongholds; rather, it would be one of migrant leaders selecting PAN municipalities for their investments.

Several observable implications derive from the demand-driven (H_D) and the supply-driven (H_S) hypotheses. If the demand-driven hypothesis holds, we should observe that migrant HTAs are reluctant to propose projects in municipalities not ruled by the PAN, and that this is the main reason for non-participation. However, if we observe that migrant HTAs are willing to make investments in municipalities regardless of party label, then we have good evidence against migrants' political preferences as the mechanism driving our statistical results.

The partisan bias that our statistical analysis reports could, in turn, be supply-driven. As with any other political or social policy, politicians may try to target particular groups with the public and social projects that the Program finances. Models 3 and 5 in Table A1 reveal that municipalities that are political strongholds of the PAN (those in which the PAN wins elections by wide margins) are more likely to participate in the Program. This is an interesting finding. According to the predictions of the distributive politics literature, the local public and social infrastructure that the Program provides could be used to tilt the balance in competitive jurisdictions rather than to reward voters that have already shown their support (Cox and McCubbins 1986; Dixit and Londregan 1996; Stokes 2005; Magaloni 2006; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Díaz Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni 2007). However, unlike other public or social programs, the 3 x 1 Program for Migrants is a public-private partnership. This implies that politicians are not completely free to decide how to allocate the Program resources, because successful participation requires the cooperation of both migrants and the municipality. As the fieldwork makes clear, the side effect of these high cooperation demands is that it is more feasible to propose partnerships and projects in electoral strongholds than in contested municipalities.

If the supply-driven hypothesis holds (H_S), it also has some observable implications: first, we should observe that PAN localities and municipalities are clearly favored during the decision-

making process leading to project selection. This has to be evident in states ruled by the PAN as opposed to states ruled by opposition parties, where the decision-making process is fragmented by vertically divided governments. Additionally, we should observe that the main reason for lower participation in high-migration municipalities not ruled by the PAN is that they are punished during the adjudication process at state COVAMs.

A corollary of the supply-side hypothesis exploits the municipal-locality dimension. As explained above, a good number of the projects funded under the 3 x 1 Program are small-scale public works executed in hamlets outside the municipal centers. These investments can be regarded as local public goods. Given the importance of the local beneficiaries and locality delegates as political brokers between HTAs and municipal authorities, we should also expect that most projects are realized in localities politically aligned with the municipality (H_L). In other words, we hypothesize that a supply-driven bias in favor of local strongholds operates in the relationship between municipalities and their localities.

Clearly, non-participation may also result from municipalities lacking strong migrant organizations. Since the sponsorship of a HTA duly registered at the Mexican Consulate is a prerequisite for proposing projects, this is a background condition that we have to consider.

It should be noted that empirically testing these hypotheses and the observable implications that derive from them requires exploring the operation of the Program both in participating and in non-participating municipalities, as well as exploring cases under PAN rule and those not. Accordingly, we now turn to the empirical strategy and case selection procedure.

3. Empirical strategy and case selection

In order to test our three main hypotheses, discussed above, we rely on qualitative evidence and fieldwork. A number of factors motivate our research design in the field. First, there is no

systematic data on HTAs regarding their size, economic capacity, history, political preferences, etc., which could be incorporated into our regression analysis. Lacking this information, we relied on a migration-intensity index, based on census data, as a proxy of migrants' organizational capacity. But, as it will be made clear in what follows, this is an inexact measure because some high-migration communities may not be as well organized as others.

Second, even though we have data for every single project, we aggregated the 3 x 1 Program data at the municipal level to match it with the election returns data that are available only at that level. Since local elections are organized by different state authorities, precinct- or locality-level returns for municipal contests are not available for our entire sample period. However, many projects and HTAs originate in smaller Mexican localities (Fox and Bada 2008). As Burgess shows (2006: 113), a very high percentage of the Program investments occur in outlying villages and hamlets outside of municipal seats or *cabeceras*. In the states of Guanajuato, Guerrero, and Michoacán these percentages are as high as 82, 84, and 73 percent respectively. Fieldwork allowed us to incorporate the level of the *locality* into our study. Much of the action of the Program takes place at the local level and depends on the relationship between localities and the municipalities they belong to. This level of analysis turned out to be particularly rich in explaining the central role of municipalities in the Program.

Third, SEDESOL data on the 3 x 1 Program contains information concerning successful projects only. SEDESOL does not systematically collect information about the entire pool of project applications. This means that we lack information about the characteristics of “unsuccessful” HTAs, unsuccessful localities or municipalities, or projects that were rejected. Thus, another goal of the fieldwork we carried out was to collect information from non-participating HTAs, non-participating localities, and non-participating municipalities. By doing

so, we gained an important understanding of the causes of non-participation or of projects being rejected.³

With quite a few actors and levels of government involved –migrants, localities, municipalities, state government, and the federation – and no quantitative information to operationalize crucial variables – such as migrant organization or municipal capabilities – fieldwork and qualitative research are essential to understanding how the 3 x 1 Program actually works and the sources of the political discretion we detected in the statistical tests. There are a number of very good case studies about the 3 x 1 Program (see, for instance, the collection in Fernández, Garcia, and Vila 2006 and Lanly and Valenzuela 2004). Yet the selection of cases is usually not well justified: sometimes they cover municipalities with a high number of projects only, with no comparison with non-participant municipalities; sometimes they deal with high-migration localities or those with highly organized HTAs, again without comparing them with similar counterfactual cases. This raises obvious concerns about selection bias and therefore about the external validity of the findings. Our study addresses this issue carefully.

Our first decision concerned which Mexican state to study. There are four states with a long-standing tradition of high migration in Mexico, all of them located in the central area of the country: Jalisco (ruled by the PAN), Zacatecas (PRD), Guanajuato (PAN), and Michoacán (PRD).⁴ These states alone received 63.6 percent of the Program resources and accumulated 69.5 percent of the projects in 2007, the final year of our sample period. At the beginning of the Program in 2002, Zacatecas had a head start with 40.5 percent of the Program total outlays; but in recent years Jalisco's relative share has come to equal it. Michoacán and Guanajuato receive fewer funds but participation has increased steadily in Guanajuato. In this state, participation has risen from 5 percent in 2002 to 10.3 percent in 2007.

*** Table 1 about here ***

Within a given state, we were looking for two binary sources of variation at the municipal level: Program participation and having the PAN party label. Fieldwork in Michoacán municipalities was ruled out due to the current insecurity situation in the region. We ruled out Zacatecas because only 14 percent of the municipal-year observations were under PAN rule, and this provided very little variation in partisanship. Jalisco, on the other hand, has enough variation in municipal partisanship but in 2006–07 more than 90 percent of its municipalities participated in the Program. Therefore, this state had little variation in participation rates.

We chose the state of Guanajuato, a PAN state located in the centre of the country comprising 46 municipalities. The selection of Guanajuato allowed us to control for collusion at the state and the federal level (both *panistas*). We then allowed variation at the municipal level along two binary dimensions of interest: Program participation and partisanship. This resulted in a 2 x 2 matrix design with two municipalities under PAN rule and two more under non-PAN rule on one dimension. On the other dimension, we had two participating municipalities and two non-participating. There is a further source of political variation at the level of the locality, which we addressed in each of the four selected cases.

The next task was to select the municipalities to be studied. In order to identify four municipalities that were relatively similar but with two of them ruled by the PAN and two of them ruled by other parties, we used propensity score matching. The idea underlying propensity score matching is to adjust multiple-case comparisons for their pre-treatment observable differences. In our case, we wanted to identify cases that were otherwise similar in a series of observable characteristics that predict being under PAN rule, but with the exception that some of them will in fact be observed as *panistas* and others will not. To do so, our first step was to

estimate a probit regression model to predict the probability that a given municipality would be under PAN rule, which is our treatment variable of interest, conditional on a series of covariates. Our probit model has the following general form:⁵

$$Pr(PAN_{municipalityijt} = 1 | X) = F(\beta \text{MIGRATION}_{ij} + \chi \text{POVERTY}_{ijt} + \phi \text{MIG} \times \text{POVERTY}_{ijt} + \text{SOCIODEMOG}_{ijt} \delta + \mu_j + \nu_t)$$

where i , j and t denote municipalities, states, and years, respectively. The model controlled for migration intensity, poverty intensity, poverty squared, interaction between migration and poverty, log population, public services coverage, as well as state and year effects. Once the model was estimated, we obtained the predicted probability of being under PAN rule – that is, the propensity scores for each municipality. Some of the cases predicted as *panistas* (treated) were in fact observed as *panistas*, but other cases also predicted as *panistas*, were not so (untreated). Figure 3 in the Appendix illustrates the distribution of our propensity scores, that is, the probability of being under PAN rule, estimated for all Mexican municipalities in our sample period. Table 1 shows our selection of treated and non-treated municipalities for the year 2007. All of these cases are high-migration municipalities with a similar propensity to be PAN-ruled according to their observable characteristics.

*** Table 2 about here ***

According to our previous statistical research, high-migration PAN municipalities were predicted to participate in the 3 x 1 Program more often than high-migration non-PAN municipalities. The PAN municipality we chose is Tarimoro (a municipality with high Program

participation) and the non-PAN municipality is Cuerámaro (a non-participating municipality). These are our two cases “on the regression line.”

We also explored the workings of the Program in two cases “off the regression line”, that is to say, two cases poorly predicted by our statistical model: one case is a PAN-ruled, high-migration municipality that does not participate in the Program (Huanímaro). The fourth case is a non-PAN-ruled, high-migration municipality that did participate nonetheless (Santiago Maravatío). If the Program is indeed used as an instrument of the federal government to benefit PAN political strongholds in PAN states, cases such as Huanímaro and Santiago Maravatío should be rather rare. Indeed, they are atypical in statistical terms. Still, studying how the Program worked or did not work in these municipalities is actually necessary to be able to adjudicate among the supply-driven and the demand-driven hypotheses.⁶

As hypothesized above, if the demand-driven hypothesis holds (H_D), we should observe that migrant HTAs are reluctant to propose projects in municipalities not ruled by the PAN. However, if we observe that migrant HTAs are willing to make investments in municipalities ruled by other parties, then we have good evidence against migrants’ political preferences as the mechanism driving our statistical findings. Santiago Maravatío and Cuerámaro are the cases to test this implication.

If the supply-driven hypothesis holds (H_S), we should observe that PAN municipalities and localities (H_L) are clearly favored during the decision-making process leading to project selection. The municipality of Tarimoro is the case to test this implication. Finally, we should observe that lower participation in the case municipalities ruled by parties other than the PAN is punished during the decision-making process leading to project adjudication. This implication will be backed up if we obtain evidence that Cuerámaro and Santiago Maravatío are somehow punished during the COVAM stage.

Of course, as well as political conflicts, a lack of migrant organization may also be causing non-participation in high-migration municipalities. This is a possibility that we have to consider when approaching the cases of non-participation: Cuéramaro (PRI) and Huanímaro (PAN). Finally, since municipal governments change every three years, we are able to exploit variation in partisanship within our selected municipalities.

Figure 2 shows a map with the municipal division of Guanajuato. The four selected cases are high migration municipalities with similar levels of poverty, population, public services coverage, and all of them are located in the southern region of the state.

*** Figure 2 about here ***

Our fieldwork consisted of over 60 semi-structured interviews in these municipalities during the summer and fall of 2010 and January 2011. We interviewed local politicians, state, and municipal Program operators and migrant leaders coming from these municipalities and their localities (see Table A2 for a list of the communities we visited). A large number of HTAs turned out to cluster in the Dallas/Fort Worth area, and we therefore also carried out fieldwork in Texas to be able to interview leaders of migrant clubs (fall 2010). We did most of the interviews in person and only a few of them, mostly with migrant leaders, were carried out by phone.⁷

In each municipality, we used personnel directories to identify our sample frame (Bleich and Pekkanen 2011): relevant local politicians and bureaucrats, who were mostly located in the social development departments. We took great pains to avoid selection bias in our interviews. Therefore, we interviewed incumbent and opposition local politicians and current and past mayors and administrators (Martin 2011). Concerning migrant leaders, we used as a sample frame the directories of clubs provided by certain municipalities and by the SEDESOL office in

Guanajuato, the directory of the Institute for Mexicans Abroad (IME), and the directory of the Mexican Consulate in Dallas. In this case, our biggest concern was to make sure that our sample included both participating and non-participating HTAs. A good number of interviewees were recruited as a result of references by other interviewees.

Finally, to increase the external validity of our findings, we carried out interviews at the state/federal level in the state of Zacatecas. Zacatecas was a PRD stronghold until 2010, and so for the entire sample period of our study. By extending our study to Zacatecas, we could understand how adding political variation at the state level and, therefore, having a more fragmented decision-making process at COVAMs, can certainly complicate politicians' attempts to target the Program in light of their political goals. Moreover, Zacatecas has a very well-organized migrant movement, which has been able to shape the rules of the Program so as to avoid any easy political appropriation (Iskander 2010).

4. Qualitative analysis

In reporting our findings, we first look into the relationship between migrants, localities, and municipalities in both participating and non-participating municipalities. Whatever is voted on at COVAMs has been previously negotiated among migrants, localities, and municipalities. This stage already constitutes an important filter, with municipalities exerting a strong influence on which projects are successfully referred to the next stage. Second, we move up the ladder in the decision-making process and study how COVAMs work, adding the state and the federation to the decision-making process.

Our interviews show the centrality of municipalities (*a*) in promoting migrant organizations and, therefore, Program participation; (*b*) in picking up localities politically aligned with the municipality; and (*c*) the political pragmatism of migrants.

The comparison of Guanajuato with Zacatecas further showed (*d*) the difficulties of inducing partisan bias in the Program when the decision-making process is more fragmented and migrant organizations are stronger. Indeed, a very strong migrant organization is an important factor over and above partisan considerations explaining the fragmentation of the decision-making process.

As it will be made clear in the qualitative evidence that follows, the political bias that we have found in the 3 x 1 Program is driven by the political influence of government officials rather than by the demands or partisan preferences of migrant leaders.

4.1. Migrants, localities, municipalities

4.1.1. Non-participating municipalities: Huanímaro and Cuerámaro.

Cuerámaro (PRI) and Huanímaro (PAN) are the two non-participating municipalities. They have 32 and 17 localities (also called *ranchos*) respectively. We approached these cases considering two possibilities: first, that the lack of a well-organized migrant community may explain non-participation; and second, that in the case of the PRI municipality (Cuerámaro) political conflicts among migrants with PAN leanings and the municipality may have resulted in non-participation. This would confirm the existence of a demand-driven bias on the part of migrants against municipalities ruled by the PRI.

The evidence shows an interesting fact: high-intensity migration is not always a good predictor of a well-organized diaspora. In both municipalities, the reason for non-participation has to be found in a poor migrant organization. We also learned that this is due in great part to a passive municipality.

In Cuerámaro there is only one organized club in the city of Hawaiian Gardens, California, but this club has been consistently losing membership. This HTA has not participated in the Program. Instead, it has promoted collaboration between the city and the municipality. The

relationship between the HTA and Cuerámaro lay entirely outside of the 3 x 1 Program. Despite a bad partnership experience with a former municipal president (Carlos Ramírez, 2000–03), the leader of this club still shows an interest in resuming collaboration as long as the municipal president “makes a move”.⁸ The delegate of the community of Tupátaro explained that there is no HTA in the community because migrants are not well organized. He complained that under the prior administration (PRI, 2006–09) “nobody explained to us anything about the Program.”⁹ The delegate of the community of San Gregorio also stated that he did not know how the Program works. “The *cabecera* has not informed us”, he added.¹⁰

The case of Huanímaro is slightly different. Although during the years we covered in our study the municipality did not participate in the Program due to the absence of registered HTAs, this situation has been changing rapidly since 2008. Interestingly, the contrast between Cuerámaro and Huanímaro, two relatively close municipalities, reveals the centrality of municipalities and community delegates in activating their diasporas abroad. If the municipal administration does not engage in this proactive role, migrant organizations may not emerge or they may decay. As the official responsible for migratory issues in Huanímaro told us, Program participation depends on whether municipal presidents and their personnel “move or not.”¹¹ In the same vein, the social development officer stated that the municipality is crucial in helping and motivating clubs to organize and register at the consulates.¹² The delegate of the locality Rancho de Guadalupe told us that she knew about the 3 x 1 Program through the municipality. In turn, she informed migrants from her community about it.¹³ And the former municipal president of the PAN (2006–09) put it clearly: “We tell them [migrants], we start having contact with them. There is a very important thing: not all localities have a club, but in all localities there are people in the US. Identifying who is abroad and asking for the address of migrants that just left (...), we tell them ‘these are the forms’ (...) that is the way we work as municipality.”¹⁴

In sum, these two municipalities did not participate in the Program during our sample period because they did not have a very well-organized migrant community.¹⁵ High migration intensity is a rough proxy for migrant organization when the municipality and the localities do not make the effort to contact their members abroad, to activate clubs, or to provide information about how the Program works, and to help with the *tramitología* (the bureaucratic red tape).¹⁶ Therefore, in municipalities that do not participate, the organization of their diasporas will not happen spontaneously. It does need to be an explicit municipal policy.¹⁷ The current municipal sub-secretary in Cuerámara puts it bluntly: the municipality has to present a budget to the delegates, explain to them how the Program works, and let them organize in the community. “Here we need to start from scratch. If we start with one or two clubs this year it would be great.”¹⁸

4.1.2. Participating municipalities: Tarimoro and Santiago Maravatío

There are two main findings concerning participating municipalities. First, whereas having an organized migrant community is a *necessary* condition to participate in the Program, it is not a *sufficient* one: municipalities handpick which HTAs to approach or whose projects to admit.¹⁹ As we hypothesized above (H_L), municipalities support projects and HTAs in localities that share their party label. Second, the source of this bias is the municipality, not the political preferences of HTAs. Migrant leaders are very pragmatic. Whereas they exhibit a good knowledge of local politics, they care much more about the specific mayor in office and personal relations of trust than about his or her particular party label (Burgess 2010). Migrants may decide not to propose projects following a bad partnership experience;²⁰ but we found no evidence of migrants’ political preferences affecting the decision to participate in the first place.

The municipality of Tarimoro (PAN) with 14 localities has been a successful participant in the 3 x 1 Program. Tarimoro was under PRI rule between 2003 and 2006. In 2006, it became a PAN

municipality and it will continue to be so from 2009 to 2012. On closer inspection, it turns out that most public infrastructure (road paving) recently provided under the 3 x 1 Program has been allocated to the community of Huapango: of the 18 projects funded in Tarimoro in 2009, 10 belong to Huapango. In some of these projects, the state government paid more than 25 percent of the total costs when the municipality ran out of funds. Since 1998 Huapango has had a very well-organized HTA based in Chicago, Illinois. The delegate of Huapango (which is a PAN stronghold) has been instrumental in securing smooth communication between the municipality and the HTA.

In an interview, Tarimoro's former municipal president in the period 2003–06 (ruled by PRI) stated that “the PAN plays safe”, meaning that the clubs that are actively supported are those from the localities that are PAN strongholds.²¹ The delegate of the *príista* locality Panales Galera mentioned that the former municipal president did not even visit the locality. “We did not have any support in the *cabecera*”, he added.²² We also interviewed the priest of the locality of La Moncada, who stated that politics does matter in the execution of projects.²³ He gave as an example the contentious relationship between the former *perredista* delegate and the *panista* mayor.

Migrant leaders from Tarimoro PRI localities corroborated this view. The co-leader of the Club San Nicolás de la Condesa remarked that the important thing about the municipality is that it can bring benefits to the community. Yet he added: “The truth is that *panistas* have not helped us...” He explained that after the municipality turned *panista* in 2006, San Nicolás, which is “90 percent *príista*”, has not hosted any public works under the 3 x 1 Program.²⁴ In the same vein, the leader of the HTA El Acebuche – another *príista* locality – also complained about the municipality investing more in the localities that shared the same party label as the municipality.²⁵

Thus, municipal authorities favor their localities when endorsing projects under the 3 x 1 Program. The aforementioned account demonstrates that the PAN sought partnerships in localities politically aligned with them. Yet close inspection reveals that the core voter or “rewarding loyalty” electoral strategy is only part of the explanation for this outcome. After seeing in detail the workings of the Program and the highly contentious character of local politics, one wonders whether mayors who want to use these resources but who lack complete control over decision allocations can do anything other than approach their political allies. Municipalities need HTAs to guarantee migrants’ contributions, and HTAs need an anchor in their localities. Delegates and local beneficiaries often contribute and supervise the execution of the works, performing the role of anchors. But the relationship between delegates, beneficiaries, and the municipality is heavily politicized along partisan lines. In turn, HTAs need the endorsement of municipalities and their technical and economic support to submit project applications to the state COVAMs. This generates a mutual need that is best satisfied when migrant HTAs belong to localities politically aligned with the municipal government.²⁶ This is an interesting finding. The introduction of private actors in policymaking might lead one to think that political manipulation would be harder as a result of enhanced monitoring. Yet the centrality of municipalities in the process of putting together applications counteracts that possibility. The public–private partnership implies that the 3 x 1 Program is badly suited to addressing the needs of opposition and very fragmented municipalities. In other words, the need for migrants’ collaboration makes it more likely that electoral strongholds will be approached.

In order to make a convincing case that biases are supply-driven, we need to rule out the possibility that migrants’ partisan preferences are driving the outcome. For instance, we need to show that the reason PAN municipalities have a greater probability of participating is not migrants’ reluctance to invest in municipalities ruled by other parties. Interviews with migrant

leaders helped us to adjudicate between the supply-driven and the demand-driven alternative hypotheses. As we saw above, migrant leaders openly complained about supply-driven biases in the relationship with the municipality. Besides, the interviews portray HTA leaders as very pragmatic actors. The migration scholar Rodolfo García Zamora attributed this pragmatism to a learning process on the part of migrants. Being aware of the volatility of local politics and the short tenures of municipal administrations (three years without reelection), the best thing migrants can do is to avoid adopting clear partisan stances. García Zamora describes HTAs as highly mobilized, but not on traditional party lines.²⁷

The Club Huapango (Tarimoro) has a long history of participation in the 3 x 1 Program under administrations led by different parties. The leader of the Club Huapango told us, “We do not care about the party; we care about the person [of the municipal president].”²⁸ The leader of the San Juan Bautista HTA, also based in Chicago and from a locality in Tarimoro too, made clear that the constitutive acts of clubs explicitly prescribe that they do not belong to or support any political party. “I would present this project even if this municipality were not *panista*.”²⁹ And according to the former PRI municipal president in the 2003–06 administration, “Migrants want public works and they do not care who provides them.”³⁰

Similarly, the leader of the Club Ojos de Agua/Novillero, located in Anaheim, California, forcefully stated, “We want to work with everybody, regardless of their party.” This newly created HTA from the municipality of Huanímore has already worked with two municipal governments from different parties (PAN and PT – *Partido del Trabajo*) “and found no differences.” The club refused an invitation to participate in the PAN candidate’s campaign in the last municipal election (2009–12). “Our policy is to work with whoever is in power...” he insisted.³¹ “Migrants do not care about the party that is in power. They want to work with whoever is there”, stated the leader of the mirror HTA at Ojos the Agua locality.³²

In the same vein, the leader of the Club Hawaiian Gardens from the municipality of Cuerámaro made it clear that her father was a former PRI municipal president but that she does not mind working with the current PAN (2009–12) municipal president “as long as he works well.”³³ The leader of the Club El Águila from the community of Santa Teresa (Santiago Maravatío) was the only migrant leader we interviewed who voted in the 2006 presidential elections. He voted for the PAN presidential candidate, Felipe Calderón. Interestingly, his club presented a project in the municipality, which is currently ruled by the PRI (2009–12). “I am not interested in the party that is in the municipality. I just want them to work for us”, he stated.³⁴ Finally, the president of the Club Hermosillo (Santiago Maravatío) explained that they want the best for their community. Yet “we do not take official positions.”³⁵

The two main findings from our fieldwork in participating municipalities – migrants’ pragmatism and supply-driven bias in favor of local strongholds – can be best summarized in the words of the leader of the HTA La Condesa. Based in Dallas, this club belongs to the locality of San Nicolás, a PRI locality in the municipality of Tarimoro (PAN). This HTA is currently in the process of submitting several applications under the 3 x 1 Program; but the leader complains about the difficulties in reaching the municipality: “We can work with whoever is there, but the municipality does not treat the localities equally [*parejo*]...”³⁶

To sum up, close inspection of the relationship among migrants, their localities, and their municipalities clearly illuminates several sources of political bias in the actual implementation of the 3 x 1 Program. In our view, the most important evidence is the central role of municipalities, which casts doubt on the characterization of this particular Program as driven by the demands of migrant clubs. As the non-participating municipalities revealed, high migration intensity is a rough proxy of a good migrant organization. When this organization does not exist, the role of municipalities and local delegates is central in spreading information and helping migrants to

organize and activate HTAs. In the absence of this proactive role, participation in the Program may not materialize, even in municipalities with a long tradition of outmigration.

In turn, the study of participating municipalities revealed that not all existing HTAs that are potentially interested in the Program receive support from municipal officials. Migrants are aware of local politics, but for the most part their approach to it is very pragmatic and non-partisan. Evidence from our interviews in the field made it clear that migrants' political preferences are *not* the source of any observed partisan bias. HTAs need the municipalities' commitment of resources and their technical help to put together their application files. This gives municipalities a strong gatekeeping role. When choosing which HTAs and projects to support, the municipality of Tarimoro favored localities that were partisan strongholds. But it is also important to recognize that, given the mutual need that exists between HTAs and municipalities, favoring strongholds is a reward-the-loyal electoral strategy as much as it is also the side effect of a policy design in which municipalities do not have full control of the Program resources, and have to cooperate with delegates and local beneficiaries, both clearly partisan.

4.2. Committees of Validation and Attention to Migrants (COVAMs): Municipalities, states, and SEDESOL in Guanajuato and Zacatecas

So far we have explored the role of municipal presidents, localities, and HTA leaders in explaining the bias found in the 3 x 1 Program in favor of PAN strongholds. As the aggregate evidence indicates, there are more cases like *Tarimoro* than cases like *Santiago Maravatío* participating in the Program. Non-PAN municipalities successfully receiving 3 x 1 subsidies are atypical. We now turn to the role of municipal, state, and federal governments in explaining this outcome. In other words, we now explore how the selection process that takes place at state

COVAMs may easily result in a bias in favor of projects presented by PAN municipalities in PAN states.

After the municipal filter, proposals reach SEDESOL and the state offices. Before being discussed and voted at COVAMs, SEDESOL and the state inspect the technical files and determine whether proposals meet the rules of the Program. Figure 1 showed the composition of COVAMs. According to the rules of operation, COVAMs consist of three representatives of each of the four actors involved. There has to be at least one COVAM meeting per year. In Guanajuato, COVAMs are held every month until resources are exhausted. More importantly, projects approval occurs on a first-come-first-served basis. This obviously implies that municipalities with a well-organized diaspora and expertise in putting together applications have a clear advantage when it comes to securing successful participation. Decisions about which projects to fund are taken by majority rule. In the case of Guanajuato, SEDESOL and the state share a party label (PAN). Every year, the SEDESOL state delegation decides which municipalities participate in COVAMs on the basis of somewhat arbitrary criteria, such as migration intensity and previous participation in the Program.³⁷ Thus, it is obvious that COVAMs' composition can be easily aligned with the preferences of SEDESOL and/or the state of Guanajuato. We attended a COVAM meeting in which all three municipal representatives came from PAN municipalities: Cortázar, Jaral del Progreso, and Manuel Doblado. In other words, 9 of the 12 votes in that COVAM were politically aligned, and they were PAN votes.

In this COVAM, decisions were made approving several public infrastructure and productive projects. The validation and approval of productive projects is left to three experts (Reglas de Operación del Programa 3x1 para Migrantes 2010). Migrant representatives do not have a say in this decision. Seventeen productive projects were evaluated. Ten of them were proposed by the municipality of Santiago Maravatío (PRI), a previously participating municipality. The expert

committee considered all of them to be *non-viable*. Interestingly, all viable projects were located in PAN municipalities.³⁸

Making a persuasive case that the bias in favor of PAN municipalities in PAN states has to do with political collusion during the decision-making process implies showing that this sort of political manipulation does not occur in states ruled by a different political party. In other words, the political fragmentation of the decision-making process in a non-PAN state should complicate the political appropriation of the Program.

Table 1 shows the correlation between municipal participation and partisanship in the four high-migration states that concentrate most of the participation and the resources of the 3 x 1 Program: Jalisco (PAN), Guanajuato (PAN), Zacatecas (PRD), and Michoacán (PRD, under the PRI since 2010). As it is possible to see, during the period 2002–07, in Jalisco and Guanajuato the share of participating PAN municipalities is significantly overrepresented relative to the proportion of total PAN jurisdictions. On the other hand, Program participation of PRD municipalities in Zacatecas is strikingly proportional to the fraction of PRD municipalities in the state.

Another set of interviews in the state of Zacatecas made clear that the strength of migrant organizations in this state actually made it very complicated for PRD or PAN politicians to systematically favor their own municipalities. As in the case of Guanajuato, all interviewees portrayed migrant federations as highly pragmatic and only “conveniently” partisan.³⁹ Thanks to their strength, migrant federations have secured a decision-making process that is fragmented enough to impede easy political manipulation of resources by governmental actors.⁴⁰

To begin with, COVAMs in Zacatecas are composed of four representatives for each of the actors involved (migrants, municipalities, the state, and SEDESOL Zacatecas), making a total of 16 members. Thanks to the rules specifically adopted in Zacatecas, each political party has a

municipal representative in the COVAM: PAN, PRD, PRI, and more recently the Partido del Trabajo (PT). Their participation in COVAMs is decided by municipalities in the meetings of Committees of Planning and Development (COPLADEs).⁴¹ Thus, a situation like the one we witnessed in Guanajuato, where all three representatives of municipalities were appointed by SEDESOL and belonged to the same party, is impossible in Zacatecas.

Also, in Zacatecas migrant organization is the strongest and has the longest tradition. Migrants have secured increasing levels of political autonomy over time (Goldring 2002; Iskander 2010). There are 14 active federations controlling Program participation: HTAs can submit projects only through migrant federations.⁴² According to one representative from SEDESOL, competition is intensifying among federations to attract HTAs and to occupy the position of migrant deputy in the state legislature – another peculiarity of this state that indicates the political strength of migrants in policymaking.⁴³ The power of these organizations is such that migrants have secured veto power at COVAMs: for decisions to be taken it is necessary to secure the positive vote of at least one of the four migrant representatives.⁴⁴ During our interviews, SEDESOL representatives openly admitted their weak position vis-à-vis the state.

Therefore, the strength of Zacatecan migrant federations, and the juxtaposition of federal and state governments, have resulted in an increased political fragmentation of the decision-making process to allocate funds under the Program. In contrast, shared PAN control of this process in Guanajuato and Jalisco has guaranteed a steady increase in the participation of these states in the 3 x 1 Program total outlays – a growth rate that, in the case of Guanajuato, cannot be justified simply on the basis of “the strength of its migrant organizations.”⁴⁵

Overall, our fieldwork evidence allows us to discard the demand-driven hypothesis and lends strong support to the supply-driven hypothesis explaining the bias in favor of PAN municipalities in PAN states. We have seen that migrants are willing to invest in municipalities not ruled by the

PAN (as in Santiago Maravatío and Cuerámara), as well as willing to invest in *localities* ruled by other parties in PAN municipalities (as in the locality of San Nicolás de la Condesa in Tarimoro). We have also seen that non-PAN municipalities are penalized in state COVAMs in PAN states (as was the case with the productive projects from Santiago).

Moreover, fieldwork yielded other important findings concerning the central role of municipalities in administering this Program and in deciding which localities would benefit from it. When clubs do not exist, municipalities are crucial in activating them. When they do exist, the partisan preferences of the municipality determine which localities are supported. We also found evidence backing our hypothesis concerning the locality–municipality relationship: localities that are partisan strongholds benefit from the local bargaining process. As it turns out, proposing and executing projects in politically friendly localities does lower the transaction costs of participation.

5. Concluding remarks

The Mexican 3 x 1 Program for Migrants is usually regarded as an international reference in the literature on cooperation between diasporas abroad and their communities of origin (World Bank 2006; Fernández, García, and Vila 2006). The Program matches each dollar sent by hometown associations to finance local projects with one extra dollar from municipal, state, and federal governments respectively. In previous research, we found evidence of a political bias in favor of PAN municipalities or PAN strongholds in Program participation. Our statistical regression analysis provides evidence of a significant association between political variables, participation, and fund allocation by the Program. However, to understand the mechanisms underlying these correlations, a more qualitative approach was essential.

We posit that the political bias in participation may be due to two possible mechanisms: on the one hand, HTAs' decisions to invest in some municipalities but not others may reflect migrants' political preferences (a demand-driven bias). On the other hand, it may be the case that government officials use the Program to direct funds according to their own political objectives (a supply-driven bias). To determine which of these two mechanisms is at work, we studied a 2 x 2 matrix of statistically selected cases of high-migration municipalities in the state of Guanajuato.

A closer look at the relationship among migrants, their localities, and their municipalities illuminates several sources of political bias in the actual implementation of the 3 x 1 Program. In our view, the most important piece of evidence to adjudicate between demand-driven and supply-driven bias is the central role of municipalities in promoting the Program and in facilitating successful participation. Clearly, this finding casts doubts on the characterization of this Program as driven by the demands of migrant clubs. As one SEDESOL representative in Zacatecas told us, this is above all a Program for mayors.⁴⁶ The experience of non-participating municipalities also revealed that high migration intensity is not always a very good predictor of the existence of migrants' organization. When this organization does not exist, the role of municipalities is central in spreading information, helping migrants to organize, and activating HTAs. To further demonstrate that the bias in favor of PAN municipalities in PAN states has to do with political collusion during the decision-making process, we showed that this sort of political manipulation does not occur in states ruled by a different political party.

All in all, the statistical and qualitative evidence suggests that the 3 x 1 Program is being used as a political instrument to reward high-migration strongholds of the federal ruling party, PAN. This result shows that this policy is ill designed to allocate public resources where they are most needed. Our research also points to the emergence of an important political "partnership" between hometown associations in political strongholds and local politicians. Without

disregarding the economic benefits that the projects may bring to the communities that actually receive them, we contend that the 3 x 1 Program for Migrants is used in part as an instrument for exchanging public infrastructure for political support. This raises fundamental questions about the social impact and the incidence of this sort of policy intervention, as well as about the limits of collective remittances as poverty reduction tools.

As it stands, the 3 x 1 Program can be easily captured by either one of two sets of interests: those of municipal presidents (the main beneficiaries of local projects among elected officials) courting loyal voters, and those of organized migrants, creating a divide in the migrant community to the detriment of smaller and recently created migrant associations. More generally, our evidence also sheds light on the potential pitfalls of using matching grant programs to deliver local public goods. As the 3 x 1 Program clearly illustrates, policies that require the coordination of several political actors – even including organized civil society (in our case, HTAs) – do not necessarily result in outcomes isolated from political and partisan bias or in more accountability. On the contrary, biases in favor of political supporters still exist, this being a way to meet the private–public partnership requirement with the lowest possible transaction costs.

REFERENCES

- Adida, C. and D Girod. 2011. "Do Migrants Improve Their Hometown? Remittances and Access to Public Services in Mexico, 1995–2000." *Comparative Political Studies* 44(3): 3–27.
- Alarcón, R. 2006. Hacia la Construcción de una Política de Emigración en México. In Carlos González (ed.), *Relaciones Estado-Diáspora: Aproximaciones desde Cuatro Continentes*. Mexico: SER, IME, Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas, ANUIES, Miguel Angel Porrúa, 157–79.
- Aparicio, F. J., C. Maldonado, and B. Beltrán. 2007. "Evaluación Externa de Consistencia y Resultados 2007 del Programa 3x1 para Migrantes." SEDESOL.
- Bleich, E. and R. Pekkanen. 2011. "How to Report Interview Data: The Interview Method Appendix." In L. Mosley (ed.) *Interview Research in Political Science*. Typescript.
- Bravo, J. 2007. "Emigration and Political Engagement in Mexico." Unpublished Ms, Nuffield College, Oxford University.
- Bravo, J. 2008. "Mexico without (Some) Mexicans: Migration and Politics in Mexico." Chapter 4. Unpublished Ms, Nuffield College, Oxford University.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alistair Smith, Randolph Siverson and James Morrow. 2003. *The Logic of Political Survival*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Burgess, K. 2005. "Migrant Philanthropy and Local Governance in Mexico in Merz, Barbara." Chapter 10 in *New Patterns for Mexico. Remittances, Philanthropic Giving, and Equitable Development*, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press.
- Burgess, K. 2006. "El Impacto del 3x1 en la Gobernanza Local." In Rafael Fernández de Castro, Rodolfo García Zamora and Ana Vila Freyer (eds), *El Programa 3x1 para migrantes. ¿Primera política transnacional en México?* Mexico: ITAM, Miguel Angel Porrúa, Universidad de Zacatecas, 99–118.
- Burgess, K. 2010. "Translocal Governance and Social Capital in Mexico." Paper presented at the 106th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington DC, 2–5 September 2010.
- Calvo, E. and M.V. Murillo. 2004. "Who Delivers? Partisan Clients in the Argentine Electoral Market." *American Journal of Political Science*, 48(4): 742–57.
- Cano, G. and A. Délano. 2007. "The Mexican Government and Organised Mexican Immigrants in the United States: A Historical Analysis of Political Transnationalism (1848–2005)." *Journal of Ethic and Migration Studies*, 33(5): 695–725.
- Chhibber, P and I. Nooruddin. 2004. "Do Party Systems Count? The Number of Parties and Government Performance in the Indian States." *Comparative Political Studies*, 37(2): 152–87.
- Córdova, A. and J. Hiskey. 2008. "Migrant Networks and Democracy in Latin America.2 Unpublished Ms., Vanderbilt University.
- Cox, G. and M. McCubbins. 1986. "Electoral Politics as a Redistributive Game." *Journal of Politics*, 48: 370–389.

- de Graauw, E. 2005. "Government Courtship of Migradollars: International Migrants' Remittances and Policy Intervention in the Case of Contemporary Mexico", 2nd Annual Political Science Graduate Student Conference, University of California at Berkeley, 2 May.
- Díaz Cayeros, A., F. Estévez and B. Magaloni. 2007. "Strategies of Vote Buying: Social Transfers, Democracy, and Welfare in Mexico." Unpublished book manuscript, Stanford University.
- Dixit, A. and J. Londregan. 1996. "The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics." *Journal of Politics*, 58(4): 1132–55.
- Durand, J., E. Parrado and D. Massey. 1996. "Migradollars and Development: A Reconsideration of the Mexican Case." *International Migration Review*, 30(2): 423–44.
- Fernández de Castro, R, Rodolfo García Zamora and Ana Vila Freyer (eds). 2006. *El Programa 3x1 para migrantes. ¿Primera política transnacional en México?* Mexico: ITAM, Miguel Angel Porrúa, Universidad de Zacatecas.
- Fox, J. and X Bada. 2008. "Migrant Organization and Hometown Impacts in Rural Mexico." *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 8(2–3): 435–61.
- García Zamora, R. 2006. "El Programa 3x1 y los retos de los proyectos productivos en Zacatecas". In Rafael Fernández de Castro, Rodolfo García Zamora, Ana Vila Freyer, coordinadores, *El Programa 3 x 1 para migrantes: ¿Primer política transnacional en México?*, México, ITAM, UAZ, Miguel Angel Porrúa, 157–70.
- Goldring, L. 2002. "The Mexican State and Transmigrant Organizations: Negotiating the Boundaries of Membership and Participation." *Latin American Research Review*, 37(3): 55–99.
- Goodman, G. L. and J. Hiskey. 2008. "Exit without Leaving: Political Disengagement in High Migration Municipalities in Mexico." *Comparative Politics*, January (40), 169–88.
- Hiskey, J. and D. Montalvo. 2008. "Governance Quality and Emigration Intentions in Latin America." Unpublished Ms, Vanderbilt University.
- Imaz, C. 2003. "Poder Político de las Organizaciones Transnacionales de Migrante Mexicanos en sus Comunidades de Origen. Estudio Comparativo de Clubes Sociales de Migrantes." In Nayarit-California y Puebla-Nueva York. In G. Lanly and M. B. Valenzuela (eds), *Club de Migrantes Oriundos Mexicanos en los Estados Unidos*. Universidad de Guadalajara.
- Iskander, N. 2010. *Creative State. Forty Years of Migration and Development Policy in Morocco and Mexico*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Jiménez, A. 2008. "Remittances and Votes: The Rise of the Migrants as a New Actor in Mexican Politics." Paper prepared for delivery at the 66th MPSA Annual National Conference, Chicago, 3–6 April.
- Kitschelt, H. and S. Wilkinson. 2007. *Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Lanly, G. and M. B. Valenzuela (eds). 2004. *Club de Migrantes Oriundos Mexicanos en los Estados Unidos*. Universidad de Guadalajara.

- Leite, P and L. Acevedo. 2006. *Migración Internacional en México: Balance y Retos Políticos*. Mexico: CONAPO.
- Levitt, P. 1998. "Social Remittances: Migration Driven Local-Level Forms of Cultural Diffusion." *International Migration Review*, 32(4): 926–48.
- Londregan, J. 2006. "Political Income Redistribution." In B. Weingast and D. Wittman (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, pp. 84–101.
- Magaloni, B. 2006. *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Martin, C. J. 2011. "The Sounds of Silence: Capturing Cause and Effect in Interviews." In L. Mosley (ed.), *Interview Research in Political Science*. Typescript.
- Moctezuma, M. and Ó. Pérez. 2006. "Remesas colectivas, Estado y formas organizativas de los mexicanos en Estados Unidos." In Rafael Fernández de Castro, Rodolfo García Zamora and Ana Vila Freyer (eds), *El Programa 3 x 1 para migrantes: ¿primera política transnacional en México?*, México, ITAM, UAZ, Miguel Ángel Porrúa, 119–38.
- Moreno-Jaimes, C. 2007. "Do Competitive Elections Produce Better-Quality Government? Evidence from Mexican Municipalities, 1990–2000." *Latin American Research Review*, 42(2): 138–53.
- OECD. 2007. *Policy Coherence for Development: Migration and Developing Countries*. Paris: OECD Development Center.
- Pérez-Armendáriz, C. and D. Crow. 2010. "Do Migrants Remit Democracy? International Migration, Political Beliefs, and Behavior in Mexico." *Comparative Political Studies*, 43(1): 119–48.
- Person, T. and G. Tabellini. 2003. *The Economic Effects of Constitutions*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Pfutze, T. 2007. "Do Remittances Promote Democratization? How International Migration Helps to Overcome Political Clientelism." Unpublished Ms.
- SEDESOL. 2010. Reglas de Operación del Programa 3x1 para Migrantes. www.sedesol.gob.mx
- Shannon, A. 2006. "Las organizaciones transnacionales como agentes del desarrollo local. Retos y oportunidades del Programa 3x1 para Migrantes." In Rafael Fernández de Castro, Rodolfo García Zamora, and Ana Vila Freyer (eds), *El Programa 3 x 1 para migrantes: ¿primera política transnacional en México?*, México, ITAM, UAZ, Miguel Ángel Porrúa.
- Soto, S. and M. A. Velázquez. 2006. "El Proceso de institucionalización del Programa 3x1 para Migrantes." In Rafael Fernández de Castro, Rodolfo García Zamora and Ana Vila Freyer (eds), *El Programa 3x1 para Migrantes. ¿Primera Política Transnacional en México?* ITAM, Miguel Ángel Porrúa, Universidad de Zacatecas, 11–44.
- Spector A. R. and Els de Graauw. 2006. "Capitalizing on Remittances: A Cross-National Comparison of Remittance Actors and Policies." Paper presented at the 2006 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago 31 August–3 September.

- Stokes, S. 2005. "Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina." *American Political Science Review*, 99(3): 315–25.
- Valenzuela, M. B. 2004. "Retos y Perspectivas de la Sociedad Civil en los Estados Unidos: entre la Participación Política y la Quimera del Desarrollo Local." In G. Lanly and M. B. Valenzuela (eds), *Clubes de Migrantes Oriundos Mexicanos en los Estados Unidos*. Universidad de Guadalajara.
- Valenzuela, M. B. 2006. "La instauración del 3x1 en Jalisco. El Acomodo de los Gobiernos Locales a una Política Adoptada por el Gobierno del Estado." In R. Fernández de Castro, R. García Zamora and A. Vila Freyer (eds), *El Programa 3x1 para Migrantes. ¿Primera Política Transnacional en México?* México, ITAM, UAZ, Miguel Ángel Porrúa, 139–56.
- World Bank. 2006. *Global Economic Prospects: Economic Implications of Remittances and Migration*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

TABLE 1. Municipal Participation in the 3x1 Program vs. Ruling Party
All municipalities and selected states, 2002-2007

Full sample (all states)	PAN	PRD	PRI	Other	Total
Non participating	2,258 22.77%	1,875 18.91%	5,433 54.78%	351 3.54%	9,917 100%
Participating	683 32.28%	456 21.55%	907 42.86%	70 3.31%	2,116 100%
Total	2,941 24.44%	2,331 19.37%	6,340 52.96%	421 3.50%	12,033 100%
Chi2 p-value =0.000					
Guanajuato (PAN state)	PAN	PRD	PRI	Other	Total
Non participating	75 53.57%	13 9.29%	45 32.14%	7 5.00%	140 100%
Participating	96 70.59%	2 1.47%	29 21.32%	9 6.62%	136 100%
Total	171 61.96%	15 5.43%	74 26.81%	16 5.80%	276 100%
Chi2 p-value=0.003					
Jalisco (PAN state)	PAN	PRD	PRI	Other	Total
Non participating	110 38.87%	15 5.30%	142 50.18%	16 5.65%	283 100%
Participating	221 47.73%	28 6.05%	200 43.20%	14 3.02%	463 100%
Total	331 44.37%	43 5.76%	342 45.84%	30 4.02%	746 100%
Chi2 p-value=0.043					
Michoacan (PRD state)	PAN	PRD	PRI	Other	Total
Non participating	21 6.56%	166 51.88%	131 40.94%	2 0.63%	320 100%
Participating	49 13.69%	171 47.77%	133 37.15%	5 1.40%	358 100%
Total	70 10.32%	337 49.71%	264 38.94%	7 1.03%	678 100%
Chi2 p-value=0.015					
Zacatecas (PRD state)	PAN	PRD	PRI	Other	Total
Non participating	11 11.34%	45 46.39%	36 37.11%	5 5.15%	97 100%
Participating	37 15.04%	113 45.93%	90 36.59%	6 2.44%	246 100%
Total	48 13.99%	158 46.06%	126 36.73%	11 3.21%	343 100%
Chi2 p-value=0.515					

Table 2. Case selection using Propensity Score Matching in Guanajuato, 2007

MUNICIPALITY	Propensity score	2007			Migration index	Poverty index	Population in '000s
		PAN ruled (treated)	Program participation	Num. of Projects			
SANTA CATERINA	0.498	Yes	No	0	1.029	3.144	4.544
OCAMPO	0.544	Yes	No	0	2.981	2.368	20.579
PUEBLO NUEVO	0.564	Yes	No	0	1.136	2.031	9.750
SAN DIEGO DE LA UNION	0.579	Yes	No	0	1.716	2.684	34.401
TARANDACUAO	0.617	Yes	Yes	5	1.342	1.689	10.252
TARIMORO	0.628	Yes	Yes	7	2.733	1.970	33.014
COMONFORT	0.636	Yes	No	0	1.403	2.230	70.189
SAN LUIS DE LA PAZ	0.649	Yes	Yes	3	1.187	2.205	101.370
ROMITA	0.652	Yes	No	0	1.071	2.114	50.580
HUANIMARO	0.698	Yes	No	0	4.330	1.997	18.456
JARAL DEL PROGRESO	0.703	Yes	Yes	12	1.167	1.553	31.780
ACAMBARO	0.704	Yes	Yes	1	2.194	1.525	101.762
SALVATIERRA	0.713	Yes	Yes	12	1.087	1.626	92.411
MANUEL DOBLADO	0.621	No	Yes	11	2.616	2.075	34.313
CUERAMARO	0.648	No	No	0	2.465	2.065	23.960
DOLORES HIDALGO	0.662	No	No	0	1.011	2.139	134.641
SANTIAGO MARAVATIO	0.668	No	Yes	8	3.660	1.969	6.389
ABASOLO	0.672	No	Yes	6	1.986	2.093	77.094

Figure 1: 3 x 1 Program participants and decision-making procedures




Figure 2. Guanajuato state-selected municipalities





Figure 3: Propensity score distribution.



APPENDIX

Table A1

Determinants of Participation in the 3x1 Program for Migrants in Mexican Municipalities, 2002 - 2007

Heckman selection models						
	Program Participation	log(Amount)	Program Participation	log(Amount)	Program Participation	Log(Amount)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Migration Index	0.261	0.093	0.278	0.093	0.278	0.091
	[0.018]***	[0.023]***	[0.022]***	[0.024]***	[0.022]***	[0.024]***
Poverty	0.833	-0.102	0.864	-0.058	0.864	-0.078
	[0.096]***	[0.131]	[0.106]***	[0.139]	[0.106]***	[0.140]
Squared Poverty	-0.133	0.016	-0.148	0.014	-0.149	0.016
	[0.018]***	[0.025]	[0.020]***	[0.027]	[0.020]***	[0.027]
Politics						
PAN State	0.214	0.006	0.167	0.071	0.16	0.074
	[0.100]**	[0.128]	[0.111]	[0.131]	[0.110]	[0.130]
PRI State	0.161	0.067	0.114	0.134	0.138	0.135
	[0.107]	[0.145]	[0.110]	[0.145]	[0.112]	[0.146]
PAN Municipality	0.112	-0.013			0.024	0.084
	[0.049]**	[0.057]			[0.076]	[0.083]
PRI Municipality	-0.066	0.011			0.007	0.108
	[0.043]	[0.049]			[0.066]	[0.078]
PAN Municipal Vote Share			0.338	0.185		
			[0.126]***	[0.142]		
PRI Municipal Vote Share			-0.295	-0.24		
			[0.170]*	[0.191]		
Municipal Competitiveness					0.018	0.756
					[0.407]	[0.468]
Shared Partisanship					0.025	-0.001
					[0.036]	[0.043]
Local Election					-0.159	-0.039
					[0.040]***	[0.046]
Competitiveness*PAN Municipality					1.272	-0.717
					[0.528]**	[0.589]
Competitiveness*PRI Municipality					-0.198	-0.863
					[0.456]	[0.547]
Log (Population)	0.15	0.171	0.143	0.17	0.14	0.173
	[0.017]***	[0.025]***	[0.020]***	[0.026]***	[0.020]***	[0.026]***
Water	0.249		0.192		0.193	
	[0.086]***		[0.095]**		[0.095]**	
Sewage	0.211		0.168		0.165	
	[0.085]**		[0.097]*		[0.097]*	
Electricity	0.006		0.022		0.008	
	[0.087]		[0.094]		[0.094]	
Constant	-0.846	0.303	-0.784	0.183	-0.863	0.071
	[0.259]***	[0.204]	[0.287]***	[0.215]	[0.282]***	[0.210]
Observations	14,519	14,519	10,897	10,897	10,897	10,897

Units are municipality/year observations. Program participation is a binary outcome, amount awarded is measured in (the log of) million pesos in constant prices. All models include state and year effects.

Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

A2. List of localities

HUANÍMARO	SANTIAGO MARAVATÍO	TARIMORO	CUERÁMARO
Cerrito Alto Nuevo Cerrito Alto Viejo Cerrito de Aguirre Copales Granja Beatriz Granja la Joya La Tinaja Los Otates Monte Blanco Ojos de Agua Ramón García San Antonio Buenavista San Isidro de Ayala San José de Ayala San Ramón Zapote de Aguirre Zapotito de Mancilla	Colonia Morelos Ojo de Agua de la Yerbabuena La Majada La Leona El Dormido Hermosillo Joyita de Pastores La Jara La Joya Grande Santa Rita Santa Teresa La Pila	San Nicolás La Moncada Panales Galera Panales Jamaica Huapango La Nopalera San Juan Bautista Ojo de Agua de Nieto La Noria El Terrero El Acebuche Los Fierros Charco Largo Rancho de Guadalupe	Tupátaro San Gregorio Ojo de Agua El Saucillo La Batalla Puerta de la Reserva Presita del Sauz Nueva Esperanza Puerta de la Caña Nuevo Edén La Sabina Platanar La Llave Santa Rita 18 de Marzo Los Hornos La Sarteneja La Soledad Galera de la Grulla La Palma Plan Sexenal San José de Ojo de Agua Barranca de la Huerta El Novillero La Regalada Buena Vista Linda Vista Cerrito de Agua Caliente Presa de Uribe San José de Rames Luz Mazas Tres Villas

Visited localities as well as those from which we interviewed migrant leaders appear in boldface.

ENDNOTES

¹ Former delegate of Huapango, Huapango, 29 June 2010. Former municipal president (PRI, 2003–06), Tarimoro, 30 June 2010. Current municipal president (2009–12), Tarimoro, 1 July 2010.

² Former municipal President (PAN, 2006–09), Tarimoro, 1 July 2010.

³ However, rejection is frequent. Between 2002 and 2004, 192 3 x 1 Program projects were rejected in the state of Michoacán, of which 73% were projects outside the *cabecera* (Fox and Bada 2008: 452). In 2010, at SEPLADER Zacatecas almost 50% of the projects presented were rejected, and about 60% of projects lacked a technical file (SEDESOL Zacatecas).

⁴ Zacatecas has been ruled by the PRI since December 2010; but it was *perredista* during the whole period of our study.

⁵ For parsimony, this specification is analog to the selection equation in the Heckman sample selection models reported on Table A1.

⁶ Note that since Table 2 refers to the year 2007 only, we made sure that high and low/non participation was not unique to this year. In other words, municipalities of high and low participation that are consistently participating or not participating during the years we covered in the database. For instance, Jaral del Progreso is a PAN municipality of high participation in 2007 (12 projects) but it did not participate in previous years. We had only two options to choose a comparable non-participating/non-PAN municipality: Cuernámaro and Dolores Hidalgo. However, Dolores Hidalgo is much more populated than the rest of our selected municipalities. Given the high correlation that exists between municipal resources and population, and the role that municipal finances play in matching the resources migrants invest, we opted for Cuernámaro to avoid the variation arising from different budgetary capacities. Similarly, we chose Santiago Maravatío over Abasolo as our non-PAN participating municipality.

⁷ To save space, the list of interviewees and the questionnaires has been omitted but is available on request.

⁸ Phone interview, 7 October 2010. The leader of the club recalled that they were invited to collaborate with funds to set up a shoe *maquiladora*. “The business failed and trust was lost”, said the leader.

⁹ Tupátaro, Cuernámaro, 21 September 2010.

¹⁰ San Gregorio, Cuernámaro, 23 September 2010.

¹¹ Huanímaro, 22 September 2010. One interesting thing is that the official responsible for migratory issues in Huanímaro under the current PT administration (2009–12) was in charge of migratory issues in the municipality of Cuernámaro during the PRI administration (2006–09).

¹² 12 November 2010.

¹³ 12 November 2010.

¹⁴ Huanímaro, 11 November 2010.

¹⁵ Our interviews in Zacatecas revealed the same. According to one member from the State Secretaría de Planeación y Desarrollo (SEPLADER), the reason why municipalities do not participate is that their migrants are not organized, the municipalities being responsible for that organization (25 January 2011). Another member from SEDESOL mentioned that HTAs are clearly promoted by municipal presidents and referred to them as “Triennial Clubs” (25 January 2011). The former representative at SEPLADER mentioned that non-participation arises because municipalities have not devoted themselves to promoting migrant organization (26 January 2011). A similar opinion was given by another representative from SEDESOL and the former representative of SEPLADER. All interviews were held at Zacatecas in January 2011.

¹⁶ Social Program Coordinator at the Municipality of Cuernámaro, Cuernámaro, 22 September 2010.

¹⁷ Research in the state of Jalisco corroborates this finding. In the municipality of Jamay, the municipal president stated that approaching the clubs depends on municipal presidents’ willingness to work: “...it depends on the municipal president, because Clubs are ready to help...” (Valenzuela 2006: 148–149; 149). Authors’ translation.

¹⁸ Sub-secretary at the municipality of Cuernámaro, 22 September 2010.

¹⁹ From 2008, migrant HTAs were required to register at the consulates and to renew their registrations every two years. This measure was taken to avoid the ad hoc creation of so-called ghost clubs by municipalities with the sole purpose of using the Program resources. Although the requirement to register has reduced this problem, our fieldwork revealed that practices such as creating a club to carry out a single project or borrowing the signatures of registered clubs (without their actual monetary contribution) were not at all uncommon.

²⁰ Migrants and delegates frequently referred to a problem of cost inflation under the Program and to unmet commitments on the part of municipalities. They perceived that the costs of public works were intentionally inflated so that public work contractors (who were selected by the municipality) could benefit. Many Program administrators

mentioned to us that one of their first tasks with migrants had to be restoring trust after failed partnerships (delegate of La Moncada, Tarimoro, 1 July 2010; Municipal President of Santiago Maravatío, Santiago Maravatío, 14 July 2010; Social Development Coordinator in the Municipality of Santiago Maravatío, 13 July 2010; delegate of Ojo de Agua, Santiago Maravatío, 14 July 2010; leader of the Club La Joyita, Santiago Maravatío, 23 November 2010; former delegate of Panales Galera, Tarimoro, 30 June 2010; the leader of Club Huapango, phone interview, 7 October 2010; The leader of Club Hawaiian Gardens, phone interview, 7 October 2010; the co-leader of Club San Nicolás de la Condesa, Dallas, 2 November 2010).

²¹ Tarimoro, 30 June 2010.

²² Panales Galera, 30 June 2010.

²³ La Moncada, 1 July 2010. Priests are frequently crucial intermediaries in the relationship between migrants and the locality, in great part because migrants' most requested investment is church restoration.

²⁴ Dallas, TX, 2 November 2010. Also, interview with the co-leader of the Club San Nicolás de la Condesa, interviewed 2 November, 2010 in Dallas, TX.

²⁵ Telephone interview, 1 November 2010.

²⁶ In fact, we observed the same discretion in favour of localities that share the municipality party label in municipalities not ruled by the PAN (which ratifies our H_L hypothesis). For instance, we found another example of the stronghold advantage plus the gate keeping role of municipalities in impeding access to the Program in the locality of Santa Rita in the municipality of Santiago Maravatío (PRI). Santa Rita is a PRD stronghold. It has an active HTA in Houston, Texas: Club Santa Rita. We visited the locality and talked to the club leader. He told us that he was involved in the electoral campaign in support of his brother-in-law, who happened to be the PRD candidate in the 2009 election. Having lost the election, the club representative complained that the doors of the presidential municipality have been closed to him and that Santa Rita would not entertain any 3 x 1 projects "because it [Santa Rita] is yellow [the PRD color]." (Santa Rita, 14 July 2010). As Valenzuela (2004) mentioned, this illustrates the risks that migrants run if they become openly partisan.

²⁷ Zacatecas, 25 January 2011. Valenzuela (2004: 477) supports this view. As the author states, "[F]or some migrant leaders the political participation of clubs, taking part in electoral campaigns, supporting some candidate, may hurt the clubs. It may hurt them in the sense that it unnecessarily risks the future support of projects and works promoted by clubs, above all when clubs support the wrong candidate." (Authors' translation).

²⁸ Phone interview, Mexico City, 7 October, 2010.

²⁹ Tarimoro, July 1, 2010.

³⁰ Tarimoro, June 30, 2010.

³¹ Phone interview, Mexico City, October 7, 2010.

³² Leader of the Mirror HTA at Ojos de Agua (22 September 2010). Although Huanímaro qualified as a non-participating municipality, migrants started to become organized from 2008 on. The official responsible for migratory issues at the municipality also stated that migrants do not make participation contingent on party labels (Huanímaro, 22 September 2010). The former delegate of the locality of Otates held that migrants talk about what can be done and how they can help; but they do not care about politics (11 November 2010).

³³ Phone interview, Mexico City, October 7, 2010.

³⁴ Dallas, TX, 1 November 2010.

³⁵ Dallas, TX, 1 November 2010.

³⁶ Dallas, TX, 2 November 2010.

³⁷ Sub-delegate from SEDESOL Guanajuato, Mexico City, 3 March 2011.

³⁸ Guanajuato, 16 July 2010. A representative of the state of Guanajuato who asked to remain anonymous openly acknowledged that this type of partisan bias in project allocation is not at all uncommon.

³⁹ Former representative at SEPLADER. Former representative at SEDESOL. Rodolfo García Zamora, University of Zacatecas. All interviews held in Zacatecas, 25 January 2011. One representative of SEDESOL, 26 January 2011. Project Director at the Zacatecan Federation of Southern California, 26 January 2011. The Zacatecan Federation of Southern California has traditionally been identified with the PRI. Yet a faction of it supported Ricardo Monreal (PRD) during his campaign in 1998 (Goldring 2002).

⁴⁰ Goldring's (2002: 83) study of the relevance of Zacatecas under PRI rule adopts a similar argument of partisan alignment to explain migrant organization's ascendancy. As Goldring explains, the alignment of the powerful Zacatecan federation of Southern California with the PRI, a PRI governor (Arturo Romo), and PRI rule at the federal level empowered migrants as strategic transnational actors in Zacatecas, unlike in other states where those political alignments were absent.

⁴¹ Former representative at SEPLADER, 25 January 2011. Former representative at SEDESOL, 25 January 2011. Former representative at SEPLADER, 26 January 2011.

⁴² Project Director at the Zacatecan Federation of Southern California, 27 January 2011.

⁴³ A former representative of SEPLADER shared this same opinion, 26 January 2011.

⁴⁴ Project Director at the Zacatecan Federation of Southern California, 27 January 2011.

⁴⁵ 27 January 2011. Regarding Jalisco, Rodolfo García Zamora shared the same opinion.

⁴⁶ Authors' interview Zacatecas, 26 January 2011.