Loyalty And Voice After Exit: Migrant Influence In New Democracies[*]

Katrina Burgess
Fletcher School, Tufts University

September 2011

The turn of the 20th century has been characterized as the "second age of globalization" partly because the number of people living outside their country of origin reached levels comparable to the "first age of globalization" a century earlier (Castles and Miller 2009, 7; Solimano 2010, 9). Between 1970 and 2010, the estimated number of international migrants more than doubled from 81 million to 215 million (Castles and Miller 2009, 5; World Bank 2011). In contrast to the earlier period, the vast majority of today's migrants are from the South, and the fastest-growing flow is from South to North (Castles and Miller 2009, 50; Kapur 2010, 3; Skeldon 2008, 5).[1] By 2009, 80 percent of all migrants were from developing countries, and their remittances totalled over $300 billion, dwarfing official development assistance ($120 billion) and portfolio investment ($85 billion) and nearly overtaking foreign direct investment ($359 billion) (World Bank 2011).[2]

During the same period, developing countries experienced another historic shift known as the "third wave" of democratization (Huntington 1991), which began in

---

[*] This paper is a draft of the first chapter of a book manuscript entitled *Loyalty and Voice after Exit: Migration and Politics in New Democracies*. Please do not cite or quote without the author's permission.

[1] In the World Bank's classification, "South" refers to low- and middle-income countries, and "North" includes both OECD and non-OECD high-income countries. It should be noted that the flow of migrants from South to South is also significant but, as argued later in the chapter, these flows have different implications for politics in the sending countries.

[2] Between 2000 and 2002, nearly 80 developing countries had at least five percent of their population living abroad (UNDP 2009). In 2006, remittances surpassed gross domestic product (GDP) in 22 countries, capital flows in 36 countries, merchandise exports in 12 countries, and commodity exports in 28 countries (Ratha 2007, 2–3).

southern Europe in the mid-1970s and spread to countries in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe in the 1980s and 1990s. By 2010, over one-third of the 144 countries classified by the World Bank as lower- or middle-income had experienced transitions from authoritarian to democratic rule since 1975 (Marshall and Jaggers 2009; World Bank 2010b). Although a few of these transitions proved unsustainable, most new democracies survived even in the face of economic dislocation and/or political crises. Nonetheless, they continue to struggle with democratic deepening, which requires moving beyond formal guarantees of contestation and participation (Dahl 1971) and establishing effective and equitable mechanisms of representation, accountability, and rule of law (Agüero and Stark 1998; Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Diamond and Morlino 2005; Hagopian and Mainwaring 2005; Haynes 2001; W. C. Smith 2009; Tulchin and Brown 2002; Villalón and VonDoepp 2005).

Despite the remarkable coincidence of outmigration and democratization in the last forty years, scholars are only just beginning to explore the ways in which they have interacted to reshape politics in developing countries. This book offers a first look at how migrants are affecting the quality of democracy in high-migration countries faced with the dual challenge of establishing democratic institutions and overcoming economic underdevelopment. In this chapter, I explore the conditions under which politics in new democracies are likely to be susceptible to migrant influence. First, I review the main challenges to democratic deepening in developing countries. Second, I show how the concepts of exit, voice, and loyalty have been applied to international migration and discuss alternative mechanisms of migrant influence on politics back home. Third, I explain how a fundamental restructuring of the global political economy has contributed

to both migration and democratization in the developing world, thereby changing the context of exit and creating conditions more conducive to post-exit loyalty and voice. Fourth, I present comparative data on democracy and migration in 41 new democracies and assess the impact of different migration profiles and state policies on a country's susceptibility to migrant influence. Finally, I provide a brief outline of the remaining chapters in the book.

Democratic Deficits in Developing Countries

Although dozens of developing countries have made successful transitions from authoritarianism to democracy since the 1970s, they continue to suffer from serious shortcomings in the *quality* of democracy. In particular, they lack adequate mechanisms of political engagement and accountability. Political engagement involves two related yet distinct processes: participation and representation. Participation, which is an essential pillar of democracy (Dahl 1971), involves actions such as casting votes, signing petitions, lobbying public officials, financing campaigns, joining a political party, belonging to a civic organization, or protesting in the streets. It can be electoral or non-electoral and can take place on an individual or collective basis. Representation has two defining features: (1) the delegation of authority from the people (the principals) to their designated representatives (the agents); and (2) the aggregation of individual interests, presumably on the basis of a set of shared preferences. Participation is critical to representation because of its role in signaling individual preferences (e.g., through elections) and limiting opportunistic behavior by the "agents" who are supposed to be acting on behalf of their constituencies.

The literature on democratic deepening in developing countries points to three sets of obstacles to participation and representation that often persist after transitions to democracy, particularly among non-elite members of society. One set involves structural constraints such as income distribution or social class, which have arguably been exacerbated by the fragmenting impact of globalization and market reforms. Although evidence regarding the relationship between poverty and political participation is mixed (Gonzalez-Acosta 2009; Krishna 2008; Nelson 1987; Verba, Nie, and J.-on Kim 1987), several authors argue that the retreat of the state and increasing class heterogeneity have undermined the capacity of the poor to engage in collective action (Holzner 2010; Roberts 1998) and weakened class-based networks of political representation (Hagopian 1998). Thus, even if the poor are willing and able to exercise their right to vote in elections, they are susceptible to clientelist manipulation and divide-and-conquer strategies by political elites. They may also be less able than wealthier citizens to make demands on politicians in between elections because they lack the economic leverage or personal connections that often serve as substitutes for collective action.

Another set of obstacles reflects the institutional legacies of authoritarianism and underdevelopment that limit popular access to decision-making even after transitions to democracy. In the absence of historical experiences that encouraged the construction of programmatic solutions to problems of social choice (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, 9), political parties tend to be clientelistic and closely tied to the personal agendas of charismatic leaders. Some of these parties have well-developed political machines that mobilize voters, but in ways that undermine their effectiveness as preference transmitters or accountability agents (Beck 2008; Gonzalez-Acosta 2009; Stokes 2005). Others suffer

from weak linkages between elected officials and their social bases, leading to a vicious circle whereby the former exploit public power for private gain and the latter disengage from politics altogether. Many post-authoritarian societies also lack a well-organized and autonomous civil society, as well as an independent and professional media. Taken together, these factors contribute to "delegative democracy" (O'Donnell 1994), whereby politicians compete in relatively free and fair elections but then are able to rule with few constraints on their executive authority, and high levels of corruption, which strike "at the very heart of democracy itself" by "denying citizens access and a role in determining collective decisions and actions" (Blake and Morris 2009, 3).

A third set of obstacles involves the persistence of attitudes that undermine democratic forms of engagement, particularly in developing countries (Diamond 1999). Some of these attitudes are associated with traditional values regarding authority and self-expression, which are said to inhibit people from revealing their preferences and demanding that public officials act on their behalf (Almond and Verba 1963; Inglehart 2000; Inkeles 1969). Others are linked to low levels of political efficacy, whereby people are disempowered either because they lack the skills or resources necessary to engage in politics or because they perceive the political system to be stacked against them (Di Palma 1970). In countries with a history of political repression, participation may be further inhibited by a culture of fear that persists even after a transition to democracy, especially if elements from the old regime remain in power. Among the negative consequences of these attitudes are political apathy and a weak culture of rights, both of which enable public officials to engage in opportunistic or corrupt behavior with relative impunity.

Besides devaluing democracy in their own right, these shortcomings in political engagement contribute to weak mechanisms of accountability, which is another critical component of democracy (Diamond and Morlino 2005; Mainwaring and Welna 2003; O'Donnell 1998; Przeworski, Stokes, and Manin 1999). Axworthy defines political accountability as "the ability of citizens to hold decision-makers to account for the power that has been delegated to them" (2005, 5). When this ability is compromised, countries suffer from corruption, impunity, and the abuse of authority by public officials even in the context of civil liberties and competitive elections. As Diamond et al. argue, "these patterns of arbitrary and particularistic behavior undermine public esteem for democracy and discourage democratic actors from committing or habituating themselves to the legal rules and constitutional procedures of democracy" (1999, 1-2).

When working properly, democratic institutions provide complementary mechanisms for holding public officials accountable. O'Donnell (1998) distinguishes between "vertical accountability" between citizens and the state (exercised through elections) and "horizontal accountability" among different branches, agencies, and levels of government (exercised through checks and balances). Although few would dispute that politicians modify their behavior to win votes, elections are insufficient to hold public officials accountable, even in consolidated democracies. Structurally, they only occur every few years, are limited to elected officials, and do not necessarily send clear signals about voter preferences, especially in the context of policy heterogeneity, prospective voting, and particularistic claims that may not be consistent with good governance (Ackerman 2004; Goetz and Jenkins 2005; Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999). Empirically, their effectiveness is often hampered by burdensome registration

requirements, restrictive voting rules, the excessive reliance of candidates on private funds, and/or voter apathy (Ackerman 2004; Schedler 1999). Electoral accountability is further undermined in many new democracies by the cultural and institutional legacies of authoritarianism, including clientelistic networks and low expectations among the citizenry regarding the appropriate behavior of elected officials (Fox 2007; Goetz and Jenkins 2005; Grindle 2007).

The traditional antidote to these shortcomings is to have strong mechanisms of horizontal accountability that can impose "credible restraints" on public officials between elections (Diamond, Schedler, and Plattner 1999, 2). Unfortunately, checks and balances are in even shorter supply in many new democracies, where legislatures are often hobbled by executive decree authority or a lack of programmatic political parties, and the rule of law is compromised by a corrupt and inefficient judiciary. Although democratic reformers have tried to compensate for these shortcomings by creating specialized bodies of oversight or passing freedom of information laws, the combination of flawed elections and weak oversight creates self-sustaining "low-accountability traps" (Fox 2007, 337) from which it is difficult to escape.

Frustrated with this harmful equilibrium, some new democracies have gone beyond traditional instruments to experiment with "societal accountability" whereby civil society organizations (CSOs) become engaged in informal monitoring through their involvement in project financing or implementation (Ackerman 2004) or are formally empowered to hold public officials accountable (Mainwaring 2003; Peruzzotti and

Smulovitz 2006; Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2003).[3] These innovations, which are especially prevalent at the local level and in the area of social policy, extend civil society's access to direct mechanisms of accountability beyond the electoral arena and thus "represent a shift towards augmenting the limited effectiveness of civil society's watchdog function by breaking the state's monopoly over the responsibility for official executive oversight" (Goetz and Jenkins 2005, 365).[4] Even in the absence of formal authority to monitor public officials, the transformation of citizens from passive clients into active stakeholders creates new incentives and opportunities for them to act as agents of accountability, which may evolve into more formal mechanisms for complementing the state's authority to exercise oversight.

Loyalty and Voice After Exit

Despite living outside their countries of origin, migrants have the potential to affect the quality of democracy back home, either positively or negatively, through their indirect and direct impact on political engagement and accountability. In a 1978 article, Albert Hirschman posits a relationship between migration and democracy based on the idea of a political safety-valve: "With exit available as an outlet for the disaffected, they were less likely to resort to voice" (1978, 102), thereby making it safer for elites to open

[3] Examples include participatory budgeting in Brazil, local vigilance committees in Bolivia, poverty fund monitoring in Uganda, social auditing in India, and social monitoring (*contraloría social*) in various Latin American countries (Ackerman 2004; Baiocchi, Heller, and Silva 2008; Cunhill Grau 2003; Goetz and Jenkins 2005; Osmani 2002; Wampler 2007).

[4] It should be noted that these participatory governance structures are often more impressive on paper than in reality (see, e.g., Gaytán Olmedo 2005)
Gaytán Olmeda and Soledad 2005). In other words, *formal* authority to monitor and/or sanction does not necessarily translate into *real* authority to do so. These structures nonetheless constitute a new and different kind of accountability and have the potential to empower civil society actors in their interactions with public officials.

up the political system to those who stayed behind.[5] His metaphors of exit and voice come from an earlier work (1970) in which he conceptualizes them as alternative responses by customers of a firm or members of an organization to a decline in the quality of the goods or services they are receiving. Exit occurs when they abandon their relationship with the firm or organization altogether. Voice occurs when they make "any attempt to change, rather than to escape from, an objectionable state of affairs" (1970, 30). Loyalty increases an individual's propensity to choose voice over exit because of stronger affective ties to and/or trust in the firm or organization.[6] Under most circumstances, exit and voice are mutually exclusive options, which means that voice will be dampened in a collectivity with high levels of exit.[7] Hirschman argues that, in the absence of loyalty, exit is the default option because it is less costly than voice, which often requires collective action, has uncertain returns, and may invite retribution.[8]

When applied to relations between citizens and the state, exit can be defined as "disengagement or retreat from the state by disaffected segments of the citizenry" (Osaghae 1999, 83). Although emigration is the most dramatic form of exit from the state, it can also take the form of participation in black markets, voluntary self-help organizations, alternative judicial systems, or other parallel institutions that carry out functions usually performed and/or regulated by the state (Bates 1981; Osaghae 1999).

---

[5] Elsewhere, Hirschman acknowledges the influence of the so-called "Turner thesis" that attributed the lack of a radical left in the United States to the possibility of moving to the western frontier (Hoffmann 2010, 63)

[6] Loyalty is often misconstrued as an alternative to voice and exit, rather than as an intervening variable that affects the threshold between them. Hirschman could have avoided this confusion had he included "silent non-exit" as a third option for responding to a deteriorating status quo (Barry 1974).

[7] Although Hirschman considered voice and exit to be mutually exclusive under most circumstances, he recognized one exception: in the case of public goods, "the alternative is … not so much between voice and exit as between voice from within and voice from without (after exit)" (1970: 104) because the only way to exit is "to leave the community by which they are provided" (1970: 101).

[8] The relative costs of exit and voice may be reversed, however, in institutions characterized by regularized patterns of interaction, particularly when there are relatively few members (Burgess 2004: 10).

As Hirschman points out, a state's inability or unwillingness to supply public goods, including social justice and political liberty, is likely to decrease loyalty and thereby encourage exit (1978, 105-106), particularly when exercising voice is difficult.[9] In the case of emigration, however, the cost of exit may rival the cost of voice, not only because of the social dislocation associated with leaving one's family and community but also because the sending and/or receiving states place legal restrictions on labor mobility. If both emigration and voice are prohibitively costly, citizens are likely to choose either internal forms of exit from the state or silence.[10]

Since Hirschman first proposed his safety-valve thesis, he and others have modified their understanding of the relationship between exit, voice, and loyalty as applied to migration and democracy. First, exit does not always make countries safe for democracy. To the contrary, authoritarian rulers in countries such as Cuba, Mexico, Morocco, the Philippines, and Zimbabwe have encouraged or at least tolerated exit as a way to relieve pressure on their regimes (Castles 2007; Kapur 2010, 8; Wright 2010), thereby postponing rather than facilitating democratization. Second, the assumption that voice and exit are mutually exclusive does not appear to hold under conditions of mass exodus from highly repressive regimes. After the fall of the Berlin Wall helped fuel the collapse of East Germany's Communist regime, Hirschman acknowledged that out-migration might unleash voice rather than undermine it (Hirschman 1993; Kapur 2010).[11]

---

[9] Drawing on Barry (1974), Fox makes a related argument that "perhaps exit can also reflect the *prior weakness* of voice" (2007: 296-97).

[10] Another option, which is somewhere between internal exit and silence, is for citizens to engage in what Scott (1985) calls "everyday forms of resistance" whereby they undermine political authority in subtle, indirect ways.

[11] Pfaff and Kim make a similar argument about East Germany, but they find that the "signaling effects" of exit, whereby high levels of out-migration undermine regime legitimacy, are overwhelmed by the "network erosion effects" when exit exceeds a certain threshold (Pfaff and H. Kim 2003, 294).

Finally, there is ample evidence that migrants remain loyal to their communities of origin and sometimes exercise voice *after* exit (Fox 2007; Gammage 2004; Hoffmann 2010; Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow 2010), a possibility that Hirschman did not consider. The clearest expression of loyalty after exit is the billions of dollars that migrants remit back to their families. Migrants also send "collective remittances" in the form of emergency assistance and investment in public goods in their communities of origin. These bonds of loyalty, which are often complemented by regular communication with family members and other local residents, are likely to increase migrants' stake in local conditions and hence their propensity to exercise voice. Moreover, the financial, human, and social capital they accrue as a result of exit "may well enhance their voice in the country of origin" (Kapur 2010, 42; Rüland, Kessler, and Rother 2009), thereby creating additional incentives to complement loyalty with voice.

Kapur (2010) identifies four channels of influence through which exit, or the possibility of exit, shapes politics in the sending countries: (1) the prospect channel, whereby expectations of future migration shape current behavior by local residents; (2) the absence channel, whereby local outcomes are altered by the departure of certain members of the community; (3) the return channel, whereby migrants return home with different endowments of human and financial capital, as well as new networks, ideas, and expectations; and (4) the diaspora channel, whereby emigrants exercise influence from abroad (Kapur 2010, 23–41). The prospect channel depends on the possibility of emigration, which may affect both loyalty and voice prior to exit. Kapur (2010: 25) offers an interesting example of a shift in group loyalty from Christianity to Judaism by several

groups in northeast India in anticipation of emigrating to Israel. With regard to voice, prospective migrants may have fewer incentives to become politically engaged or to demand public goods at home that are available in the host countries. By the same token, the threat of exit may enhance the effectiveness of voice by highly-valued members of society, thereby increasing their propensity to choose voice over actual exit.

The absence channel, which is most consistent with Hirschman's analysis, captures the impact of exit on those left behind. As Kapur notes, absence can have either negative or positive effects. Negatively, it can result in a loss of human and/or social capital, with the related consequence of weakened demand for better institutions. Positively, it can reduce the risks of political opening by authoritarian elites and/or create political space for new groups, thereby enhancing political and social mobility among non-migrants. Kapur argues that the latter has played a major role in enabling India's democracy to adapt to profound social changes.

The return channel results from a reversal of the initial decision to exit, with a different set of implications for loyalty and voice. Return migration may be motivated by a combination of loyalty and improved life chances back home but it may also result from deportation, a lack of opportunities, and/or deep disillusionment with conditions in the host country. The reasons for return are likely to shape the effects on voice. Migrants who have been "successful" and are returning for positive reasons are likely to bring endowments of human, financial, and/or social capital that enhance their capacity (and perhaps willingness) to exercise voice. A dramatic example is the return of successful migrants to run for political office back home. By contrast, those who return involuntarily or reluctantly are likely either to be politically disempowered (Pérez-Armendáriz and

Crow 2010, 140–141) or to engage in socially disruptive forms of voice (e.g., gang members deported back to El Salvador).

Finally, the diaspora channel consists of loyalty and/or voice after exit and captures the unique status of migrants as being "of" but not "in" their communities of origin (Fox 2005) or, in Kapur's words, "the effect of the deterritorialized nation on the territorial nation" (2010, 28). In some cases, the diaspora channel can be overtly anti-democratic by facilitating criminal networks or supporting violent insurgencies in the country of origin (Kapur 2010, 32–35). In most cases, however, migrant influence on democracy is more subtle and complex, particularly in countries that have already made a transition from authoritarian rule.

While all four channels of migrant influence can be expected to affect democratic deepening in developing countries, this book focuses on the diaspora channel, whereby migrants influence outcomes back home after exit. The mechanisms of political influence through this channel can be either indirect or direct. Indirect mechanisms are triggered by loyalty in the form of remittances and regular communication with non-migrants back home. First, economic remittances, whether in the form of individual transfers to family members or collective donations to support community projects, may reshape the political incentives of non-migrants. On the one hand, they may become less inclined to exercise voice because they no longer rely on local politicians to provide basic necessities or public goods. In other words, remittances may dampen voice by facilitating internal exit from the state, with negative implications for democratic deepening. On the other hand, remittances may break the dependence of non-migrants on clientelist exchanges

with local powerbrokers, thereby lowering the costs of voice and encouraging them to demand more democratic leaders and practices.

Second, social remittances, which Levitt defines as "the ideas, behaviors, and social capital that flow from receiving to sending communities" (2001: 11), may reshape the political attitudes and practices of non-migrants. As with economic remittances, the potential effects of social remittances on democratic deepening are ambiguous. Not only do they depend on the content, durability, and transmission mechanisms of the newly-acquired values, but they are also contingent on the receptivity of non-migrants and the local opportunity structures in which they are embedded (Levitt 2001). Even if migrants are communicating democratic values or expectations, their family and friends may react with cynicism and resignation rather than voice if they do not feel sufficiently empowered to change political practices or punish corrupt leaders.

These indirect mechanisms of influence do not constitute voice after exit unless migrants intentionally use financial or social remittances to influence politics back home.[12] Nonetheless, sustained loyalty to their communities of origin increases both their propensity and their opportunity to complement loyalty with voice by engaging in direct mechanisms of influence from abroad. These mechanisms can take several forms. First, migrants can lobby family members, community leaders, or public officials to support particular candidates, political parties, initiatives, or policies. Second, they can make financial contributions to political campaigns or causes. Third, they can mobilize for and/or exercise diaspora political rights, most commonly in the form of expatriate voting and migrant representation in local legislatures. Finally, they can use collective

[12] For an intriguing, cross-national study of the use of remittances to shape electoral outcomes back home, see O'Mahoney (2009).

remittances as leverage to induce local governments to invest in public goods and/or alter their styles of governance.

As with indirect mechanisms of influence through loyalty, the direct exercise of voice after exit can have varied consequences for democratic deepening in the sending countries. On the one hand, migrants may weaken democracy by crowding out domestic claims to representation, supporting leaders or policies that perpetuate corrupt and/or exclusionary practices, or exacerbating ethnic, religious, or partisan cleavages. On the other hand, they may strengthen democracy by encouraging electoral competition, expanding the political franchise, empowering local residents to demand their rights, and holding politicians accountable in their communities of origin. Once again, the nature of their influence is contingent on a multitude of variables affecting the migrants and their communities of origin, which we will explore further in this book.

Changing Context of Exit

One reason Hirschman may have overlooked loyalty and voice after exit is that they have become much more prevalent in recent years as a result of the two historic shifts mentioned earlier: (1) the accelerated flows of South-North migration; and (2) the third wave of democratization, which also predominantly affected developing countries. Both shifts coincided with a fundamental restructuring of the global political economy that coalesced in the 1970s. First, the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates and capital controls came unraveled, contributing to higher levels of capital mobility and greater volatility in financial markets. Second, there were major changes in the internal structure of economies. In developed countries, and to a lesser degree in the newly

industrializing countries, the predominant model of industrial organization shifted from Fordist mass production, which was predicated on vertical integration and stable demand, to flexible specialization, which placed a premium on customization, subcontracting, and flexible supply (Piore and Sabel 1984). At the same time, the share of the labor force employed in services increased significantly in both developed and developing countries. Finally, dozens of countries abandoned high levels of state intervention and protection in favor of more market-driven, outward-oriented policies. This change was driven in part by the internal contradictions of state-dominated growth, particularly in the Soviet bloc, but it was accelerated in many developing countries by the oil shocks of the 1970s, which laid the groundwork for the 1980s debt crisis and prompted a shift from import substitution industrialization to export-led growth.

Taken together, these changes have had several consequences relevant to both South-North migration and democratization. One consequence is the increased integration of developing countries into the global economy. By the 1990s, most of these countries had become signficantly more open to international trade, investment, and capital flows, as well as more integrated into transnational labor markets. Despite increased restrictions on labor mobility, which contrasted sharply with the liberalization of rules governing flows of goods and capital, millions of people from developing countries migrated north (or west) to fills jobs created, at least in part, by the expansion in subcontracting, non-union employment, and the service sector in developed countries (Piore 1980; Sassen 1990).[13] At the same time, the remittances generated by these

[13] The most notable exception to increased restrictions on labor mobility is the creation of the European Union, which allowed free movement of labor among EU members. At the same time, however, the EU and its member states have heightened restrictions on inflows of workers from outside the EU.

migrants became a key source of foreign exchange for governments that now relied more heavily on external sources of development financing. Increased integration into global markets also exposed a broader segment of developing societies to Western consumerism and popular culture, which may have increased their inclination to migrate in search of a higher standard of living (Sassen 1998). Finally, heightened dependence on global trade and finance raised the costs of maintaining authoritarian rule, particularly in countries lacking huge markets or abundant natural resources, while integration into global markets enabled authoritarian elites to diversify away from repressive agriculture (Wood 2000) and contributed to the diffusion of global norms in favor of democracy (Fukuyama 1992; Huntington 1991).

Another consequence of the restructuring of the global political economy is recurring economic dislocation in many developing countries, caused by the debt crisis in the 1980s, the dismantling of highly interventionist and protective state policies in the 1990s, and/or exposure to external shocks in the late 1990s and early 2000s. There is significant evidence that these dislocations have spurred increased outmigration (Solimano 2010). We find a particularly dramatic example in the case of Ecuador, where a deep economic crisis in the late 1990s sparked a sudden and significant increase in international migration across gender, region, and social class (Jokisch and Pribilsky 2002). The Mexican case provides more gradual but just as compelling evidence for the link between economic dislocation and outmigration, which accelerated and became more diversified in the 1990s in the wake of falling living standards, the retreat of the state from the provision of credit and subsidies to small farmers, and a redistribution of regional income and growth away from Mexico City (Burgess 2009). Although economic

dislocation can pose a serious challenge to new democracies – in some cases prompting authoritarian reversals – it has also contributed to democratic transitions by discrediting authoritarian leaders and/or encouraging military rulers to return to the barracks.

A third consequence of global economic restructuring is the increasing heterogeneity, volatility, and informality of labor markets, particularly in developing countries. Although these countries have always had relatively large informal sectors, the share of workers in this sector has grown significantly in the last two decades (UNCTAD 2002). Meanwhile, the job opportunities and social safety nets available to workers in the formal sector have, in many cases, shrunk even further. Relatedly, urban labor markets became increasingly incapable of absorbing displaced rural workers (Castles 2007, 5). In response, growing numbers of households have turned to international migration, and particularly remittances, as an alternative strategy for providing income smoothing and social insurance (Pozo 2005; Solimano 2010). At the same time, the fragmentation of labor markets and declining power of unions have created additional obstacles to class-based collective action which, paradoxically, has made democratic politics less threatening to economic elites (Roberts 1998; Weyland 2004).

Migration Trends in New Democracies

These global shifts are by no means the only drivers of either South-North migration or democratization since the mid-1970s, nor have they affected all developing countries to the same degree or in the same ways. Nonetheless, they have contributed to the convergence of these trends in many places. Table 1.1 identifies 41 developing countries that have undergone transitions from authoritarianism since 1975 and can be

classified as democratic based on their Polity scores.[14] We find the largest number of new democracies in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), followed by Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), and Eurasia (ECA). By contrast, there are only three new democracies in the other three regions, although several countries in East Asia (EAP) and South Asia (SAS) have hovered close to the threshold (e.g., Malaysia, Bangladesh, and Pakistan). Until the recent upheavals that began in Tunisia and Egypt, the Middle East and North Africa (MNA) appeared largely immune to the third wave, with no country except Lebanon anywhere close to qualifying as a new democracy in 2009.[15]

As illustrated by their average Polity scores, nearly all of these countries have struggled with serious shortcomings in the quality of democracy.[16] Out of a possible score of 10, Latin America has the highest regional score (7.88) and includes the only new democracies to receive the maximum score in 2009 (Chile and Uruguay). At the

---

[14] The 41 countries in Table 1.1 share the following characteristics: (1) a transition to democracy since 1975; (2) a Polity regime score of 6 or higher in 2009 and/or an average Polity regime score of 6 or higher since the transition year; (3) a World Bank classification as low income (LIC), lower middle income (LMC), or upper middle income (UMC) in 2010; (4) a population of at least 500,000 people in 2009; and (5) available data on migration and remittances. The regime scores are taken from the Polity IV Project, which calculates degrees of democratic and autocratic authority along a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy), with a score of +6 considered as the threshold for a democracy (Marshall and Jaggers 2009). Besides being widely used, the Polity dataset has the advantage of providing time series data over many decades. I have excluded Guinea-Bissau from my sample even though it meets the minimum Polity threshold because the political situation has deteriorated dramatically since 2009. It should be noted that regime datasets developed by other institutions (e.g., Freedom House, Economist Intelligence Unit) classify some of these countries differently.

[15] And even Lebanon's score may be inflated, given the country's recurring political crises, most recently in January 2011 when the government collapsed as a result of sectarian disputes over prosecution of the assassination of Lebanon's former prime minister in 2005 ("Political crisis shakes Lebanon," *Washington Post*, January 13, 2011).

[16] The average Polity score is based on the number of years since the country's transition. I extended the Polity figures for regime duration in the cases of Comoros, Ecuador, Lesotho, and Macedonia. Each of these countries experienced a few years of democratic decline or reversal following their initial transitions to democracy but met the Polity threshold in 2009. I therefore chose to treat their de-democratizing episodes as temporary setbacks in a protracted transition rather than as regime changes. The average Polity scores for these countries include the lower (and sometimes negative) scores received in the reversal years. I also changed the Polity transition year in El Salvador from 1984 to 1994 in accordance with the view that the military did not cede power to the civilian leadership until the 1994 elections that followed the 1992 Peace Accords (see, e.g., Karl 1990). I have included Sierra Leone and Zambia in the sample despite their subpar average scores because they surpassed the 6 point threshold in 2007 and 2008, respectively.

same time, four countries in the region (El Salvador, Guyana, Honduras, and Paraguay) score below the sample average. East Asia and Eurasia have slightly lower regional scores (7.55 and 7.54, respectively), with six countries (Indonesia, Albania, Macedonia, Moldova, and Ukraine) scoring below the sample average. Democracy has fared even worse in Lebanon, Nepal, and Africa, where only three countries score above the sample average, of which two (Kenya and Senegal) have experienced an alarming deterioration in democratic quality in recent years.[17] Even if we look only at the 2009 scores, nearly three-quarters of the countries in the sample receive a score below nine, suggesting the widespread persistence of democratic deficits.[18]

[Table 1.1 about here]

Table 1.2 shows that all of these new democracies are affected by international migration, although to varying degrees and in different ways.[19] To measure the overall impact of migration, I constructed a Migration Intensity (MI) Index that includes the emigration rate (2010), total remittances (2007), and remittances as a share of GDP (2007).[20] Aside from Lebanon, which has a very high MI score of 81.0, Eurasia is the

---

[17] In fact, Levitsky and Way argue that Kenya and Senegal have not made complete transitions to democracy and should therefore be characterized as competitive authoritarian regimes rather than democracies (Levitsky and Way 2010, 265–276). South Africa is the only other country in the region that scores above the sample average. Cape Verde can also be considered a success story, particularly in the African context. Although it is not included in the Polity database, it is scored as fully democratic by Freedom House.

[18] Moreover, most of the countries that received a score of nine or above in 2009 have major shortcomings in the quality and/or sustainability of their democratic regimes. For example, the scores for Albania and Nicaragua are arguably inflated; Peru and South Africa continue to struggle with the legacies of highly divided societies; and the democratic process in Mexico is threatened by the spread of drug-related violence, particularly at the subnational level.

[19] Although I am focusing on emigration from these countries, it should be recognized that many of them are also immigrant destinations. The most striking example is Ukraine, which had the fourth-highest number of international immigrants in the world in 2005 (Kivisto and Faist 2009, 55).

[20] I have combined these indicators into a single index because each one captures a different yet important aspect of migration intensity. Other scholars have constructed similar indices (Córdova and Hiskey 2010; Goodman and Hiskey 2008). It should be noted that statistics on migration and remittances are notoriously problematic, since they are based on national accounts with varying degrees of accuracy and do not fully

region with the highest migration intensity. Moldova is a particularly striking case, with 21.5 percent of its population living outside the country in 2010, and remittances totalling more than a third of the country's GDP in 2007. Albania also receives a high score, largely because of its high rate of emigration. Of all the countries in the region, only Latvia and Turkey have an MI score below the sample average. We find the next-highest regional MI scores in Nepal and East Asia. While Indonesia receives a relatively large volume of remittances, Nepal and the Philippines are heavily dependent on remittances, which account for more than 10 percent of their GDP. In addition, nearly 10 percent of the Filipino population lives abroad as either permanent residents or temporary overseas workers (Asis 2006, 25).

[Table 1.2 about here]

Latin America is not far behind East Asia, although with some important intra-regional variation. With the exception of Mexico, the countries with the highest MI scores are located in Central America and the Caribbean, have small populations, and are heavily dependent on remittances.[21] Mexico stands out as the one large country in the region that is heavily affected by migration. Although remittances represented only three percent of Mexico's GDP in 2007, it has the fourth-highest emigration rate in Latin America and continues to receive more total remittances than any other new democracy in the world.[22] We find very different patterns in South America, where only Bolivia and Ecuador have MI scores above the sample average. The region with the lowest migration

account for irregular or informal flows of people and money. Nonetheless, they do enable us to see broad patterns across a large number of countries.

[21] Although Guyana is located on the South American continent, it is commonly considered to be part of the Caribbean.

[22] The only countries that receive more remittances than Mexico are India, which is an established democracy, and China, which has an authoritarian regime.

intensity among new democracies is Africa. The most notable exceptions are Cape Verde and Lesotho. While neither country receives large volumes of remittances, Cape Verde has a very high emigration rate, and Lesotho is heavily dependent on remittances relative to the size of its economy. Senegal is the only other African country with an MI score above the sample average.

These scores provide us with a clear snapshot of which new democracies are broadly affected by migration and remittances, but they do not tell us anything about the *type* of migration, which is likely to have significant implications for post-exit loyalty and voice (Kapur 2010). Five other indicators on which we have comparative data are where migrants live, their levels of education, whether they are classified as political refugees, their gender, and their relative degree of integration into the host society.[23]

[Table 1.3 about here]

Table 1.3 reveals several interesting patterns across these indicators. With regard to destination, we find significant variation in the share of migrants living in OECD countries. Following Lebanon, the regions with the highest share of OECD-based migrants are Latin America (73.1 percent) and Eurasia (61.9 percent), which is not suprising given their proximity to North America and Europe. In Latin America, the only countries with a score below the sample average are Chile, Nicaragua, and Paraguay. Eurasia is more evenly divided between high-scoring and low-scoring countries. Whereas over 85 percent of migrants from Albania, Macedonia, Romania, and Turkey live in OECD countries (primarily in Europe), this figure falls below 22 percent in

[23] Another variable that is likely to be quite relevant, but for which we lack comparable data, is legal status. Although the overall share of undocumented workers in Europe and North America has increased in recent years (Kivisto and Faist 2009), the legal status of migrants from different countries varies significantly and is likely to shape their inclination and opportunity to engage in post-exist loyalty and voice.

Moldova and Ukraine, both of which have large numbers of migrants in Russia. The share of OECD-based migrants is much lower for the other regions, with some notable exceptions. In East Asia, the Philippines stands out for its high share of migrants in the United States, even when we take into account the large numbers of temporary overseas workers in the Gulf states. Likewise, Cape Verde, Comoros, Kenya, and Sierra Leone have over 65 percent of their migrants in the OECD, compared to an average of only 28.2 among the rest of the African countries.

Table 1.3 also shows that not all OECD-based migrants are equally concentrated within the OECD, as measured by a weighted average of their share in the top three OECD destinations. The rate of OECD concentration is highest among migrants from Latin America (82.1), followed by Africa (65.3), Nepal (61.8), and East Asia (61.0). By contrast, with the exception of Albania, Moldova, and Turkey, OECD-based migrants from Eurasia are much more spread out, resulting in a regional concentration rate of only 57.3. Across individual countries, the scores range from over 95 for Comoros, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico to below 45 for Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, and Namibia.

With regard to education, Table 1.3 illustrates widespread variation in levels of educational attainment as measured by a weighted average of the share of OECD-based migrants who have a primary, secondary, or university education. Overall, countries that are farther away from North America or Europe (and therefore have a lower share of their total migrants in the OECD) tend to receive higher scores, which is not surprising given the obstacles to long-distance migration faced by most working-class migrants. East Asia receives the top regional score (58.6), followed by Nepal (55.7), Africa (47.2), and

Lebanon (46.7). By contrast, Eurasia and Latin America have the lowest shares of migrants with a university education and the highest shares with only a primary education. Once again, we find notable exceptions to these trends. While OECD-based migrants from Cape Verde, Comoros, Mali, and Senegal have much lower levels of educational attainment than the regional (and sample) average, OECD-based migrants from Latvia, Moldova, Romania, and Ukraine score above the regional (and sample) average. There is also significant variation within Latin America, where South American countries (including Guyana) receive consistently higher scores than countries in Central America or the Caribbean.

Table 1.3 reveals different but equally illuminating patterns regarding the rate of tertiary migration. Following Lebanon, which has 43.7 percent of its university-educated people living in OECD countries, Africa receives the highest score (27 percent), followed by Latin America (18.7 percent). Cape Verde and Guyana have lost a particularly high share of their most educated citizens, with over 80 percent of them living in OECD countries. Also in this category are between 30 and 50 percent of the university-educated people from El Salvador, Nicaragua, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. These rates are dramatically lower for East Asia and Eurasia, with only Macedonia having more than 20 percent of its university-educated population living in an OECD country. East Asia has the lowest rate of tertiary emigration (8.2 percent) despite being the region with the largest share of its OECD-based migrants having attended university.

Finally, Table 1.3 presents comparative data on refugee stocks, gender, and levels of integration into the host country. With regard to refugee status, we find relatively little cross-national variation in the share of migrants who are refugees, which was below five

percent in every new democracy except Liberia, Namibia, and Sierra Leone in 2007. In countries such as Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Liberia, Mali, Nicaragua, Romania, and Sierra Leone, refugee stocks fell dramatically following their transition from highly repressive regimes and/or civil wars (UNHCR various).[24] In several other countries, however, the absolute number of refugees either remained unacceptably high or grew in the post-transition period, indicating democratic deficits such as civil conflict, human rights abuses, authoritarian reversals, public insecurity, and/or localized repression.[25] In fact, there is an inverse correlation between the refugee share of emigrant stocks in 2009 and a country's post-transition Polity score across the entire sample. Nonetheless, while these trends clearly signal the need for democratic deepening, they do not negate the overall predominance of voluntary over forced migration from new democracies.

There is greater cross-national variation with regard to gender. Women account for just over half of all OECD-based migrants from the sample countries, and they are in the majority among migrants from East Asia and Latin America, with the exception of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Mexico. By contrast, migrant gender is evenly divided in Eurasia and male-dominated in the other regions, with women accounting for fewer than 40 percent of OECD-based migrants from Nepal, Mali, and Senegal. In Africa, the most notable exceptions to this trend are the high shares of female migrants from Cape Verde (54.6 percent), and Namibia (58.1 percent).

---

[24] Given the lack of data before 1994, I am using this year in the case of transitions that occurred earlier.
[25] Refugee stocks from Moldova, the Philippines, Turkey, and Ukraine suddenly spiked a decade or more after their democratic transitions because of regime crisis or ethnic conflict. Although these numbers declined several years later, only the Philippines returned to pre-crisis levels by 2009. Refugee stocks from Albania, Kenya, Mexico, and Nepal have steadily increased since 1994 (or the transition year, in the cases of Kenya and Mexico), although their absolute numbers remain below ten thousand except in Albania. Finally, refugee stocks from Ghana, Lebanon, Peru, and Senegal were nearly as high or higher in 2009 than they were in 1994 (or the transition year, in the cases of Ghana, Lebanon, and Senegal).

With regard to integration, Table 1.3 creates a proxy based on two indicators for OECD-based migrants: (1) an index of the duration of residence in the host country; and (2) the share of migrants who have become naturalized citizens of the host country.[26] Although far from a complete measure of integration, these indicators tell us something about the time horizons and community orientation of different migrant groups in OECD countries. Time horizons can range from temporary workers with formal contracts that require them to return home in a few years to naturalized residents who have lived in the host country for decades and no longer have relatives in their community of origin. For the majority of migrants who fall somewhere in between, their temporary or permanent status is shaped by the policies of the receiving countries and/or their own expectations regarding return. Of particular importance is their "socially expected duration" in the host country, which refers to the expectations of family and friends regarding the length of their stay and has been shown to have a significant impact on migrant decision-making (Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller 2003). Relatedly, community orientation refers to the distinction between "transplanted" communities, which emerge when migrants recreate social networks and practices from back home, and "constructed" communities, which emerge when they develop new networks and practices in the host society (Wampler, Chávez, and Genova 2009).

Aside from Lebanon, Latin America receives the highest regional duration score (67.0), followed by East Asia (65.6) and Africa (62.4). Except for Latvia, Moldova, and Turkey, migrants from Eurasia are much less likely to have been in the host country for

[26] The duration index is based on a weighted average of the share of migrants who have stayed the following lengths of time in the OECD host country: 0 to 5 years, 5 to 10 years, 10 to 20 years, and more than 20 years. A maximum score of 100 would indicate that all of the country's migrants have been abroad for more than 20 years. Unfortunately, these data are not complete for all OECD countries, including Great Britain, Germany, and Japan.

long periods, most likely reflecting their greater access to temporary work contracts in Europe. Among individual countries, the scores range from over 75 in Moldova, Panama, and Uruguay to below 45 in Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, and Nepal. Different patterns emerge when we look at naturalization rates. Other than Lebanon, which once again scores very high (77.9 percent), the region with the greatest share of naturalized migrants in OECD countries is East Asia (65.1 percent), followed by Africa (46.3 percent), Eurasia (43.5 percent) and Latin America (42.5 percent). Among individual countries, the rates range from over 65 percent among migrants from Indonesia, Latvia, Ukraine, Guyana, Panama, Lebanon, and Comoros to below 25 percent among migrants from Albania, Brazil, Ecuador, Nepal, and Mali. While longer duration is positively correlated with higher rates of naturalization among most migrants from Asia and Europe (with the exception of Moldova and Turkey), migrants from several countries in Africa and Latin America do not follow this pattern, suggesting that even long-time residents remain only partially integrated into their host societies. Table 1.3 identifies ten countries that fall into this category because they combine above-average duration scores with below-average naturalization rates.[27]

Susceptibility to Voice after Exit

These indicators of migration intensity and migrant profiles offer an important set of clues as to which new democracies are likely to be most susceptible to voice after exit. Countries with higher MI scores can be expected to have more well-developed migratory

[27] Unfortunately, the duration and naturalization indicators do not include Germany, which is the top destination for Turkish migrants. Studies suggest, however, that Turks in Germany are even more likely to be partially integrated since the majority of them arrived before the 1980s yet, largely as a result of restrictionist citizenship policies, have a very low naturalization rate of around 20 percent (Böcker and Thränhardt 2006; Caglar 2006).

networks, since a sizable number of their residents have migrant relatives and/or receive remittances. This scenario creates numerous points of access for migrant influence, particularly if the migrants are highly concentrated in the host country. Countries with more well-educated migrants and/or higher tertiary emigration rates are open to a more targeted form of influence. Not only do these migrants possess skills and resources that are presumably of value to the home country, particularly if they are in short supply, but they are likely to be particularly well-equipped to organize collectively and exercise leadership. Thus, even if migration intensity is low, they may have the capacity to exercise meaningful voice after exit.

With regard to destination, countries with a higher share of migrants in the developed democracies of the OECD may be more exposed to certain kinds of influences. First, migrant incomes are likely to be higher in these countries, endowing migrants with more capacity to exercise financial leverage with relatives and governments back home.[28] Particularly if migrants pool these resources to invest in public goods or private entreprises, they may have influence even if their home country is not highly dependent on remittances in the aggregate. Second, migrants living in these countries are more likely to be exposed to democratic practices and values, if not in their own experiences, then in the society at large (Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow 2010). Relatedly, they may develop higher expectations of how governments should perform and the quality of public services. This exposure could shape (1) the amount of their influence by allowing them to organize collectively; and (2) the content of their influence by encouraging them to complain about authoritarian practices and/or demand greater accountability back

[28] In the case of Mali, for example, while only three percent of Malian migrants live in Europe, they contribute around 64 percent of Mali's remittances (Galatowitsch 2009).

home. These effects are likely to be magnified in countries whose OECD-based migrants are highly concentrated, which is likely to create more favorable conditions for transnational identity formation and collective action, particularly among migrants who were politically active before migrating (Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller 2003; Levitt and Lamba-Nieves 2010; Waldinger and Lim 2009).

We may also find differential impacts related to gender and refugee status, although the latter are likely to be less significant in new democracies because of the relative lack of cross-national variation. With regard to gender, several studies of Latin American migrants in the United States have found that men are more likely to be politically active in their communities of origin (Goldring 2001; Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller 2003; Jones-Correa 1998), whereas women are more likely to focus their energies on building a new life in the host country (Kandel and Massey 2001; Pessar and Mahler 2003; Wampler, Chávez, and Genova 2009). Other studies suggest that female migrants are less likely to work in niche markets than men (Bastia 2007), thereby reducing their opportunity to engage in collective action. There may also be gendered effects related to levels of politicization, civic engagement, and access to channels of influence back home that lower the propensity of women to exercise voice after exit. Nonetheless, women are by no means absent from diaspora engagement with politics back home. They have long provided behind-the-scenes support for male-dominated initiatives and are increasingly emerging as important leaders in diaspora organizations.

With regard to refugee status, countries that experienced a shift from forced to voluntary migration as part of their democratic transitions may continue to feel the effects of this legacy even after a dramatic decline in refugee stocks. On the one hand, political

refugees are more likely to have strong feelings of resentment against the government of their home country (Kapur 2010, 43), which may be difficult to overcome even after a transition to democracy. On the other hand, they are more likely to be politicized and to have acted collectively prior to exit, which increases their propensity to form political organizations in the host country and/or exercise post-exit voice (Landolt, Autler, and Baires 2001; Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt 1999; Rother 2009; Waldinger and Lim 2009). Political refugees may also have opportunities to become integrated into networks formed in solidarity against the repressive regime in their home country (Hamilton and Chinchilla 2001; Portes, Escobar, and Radford 2007, 270), particularly if they are living in North America or Western Europe.

The impact of integration into the host society on post-exit voice is also likely to be mixed. Contrary to prior assumptions, several studies suggest a non-linear relationship between integration and transnational engagement, whereby first-generation migrants who are well-established and upwardly mobile are the most inclined to care about politics back home and participate in transnational migrant organizations (Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller 2003; Orozco and Rouse 2007; Portes, Escobar, and Radford 2007; Portes 2003). Thus, migrants who have spent more than five years in the host country but are not politically integrated through naturalization may be more prone to exercise voice after exit than either workers who just arrived or long-time residents with citizenship rights.[29] Even if these partially integrated migrants no longer entertain the idea of returning to their home country, they are likely to be straddling transplanted and constructed

[29] As explained in Chapter 3, temporary overseas workers from the Philippines do not fit this pattern, arguably because the policies of their home government have an unusually strong impact on their migration experience and thereby give them a vested interest in exercising voice after exit.

communities, thereby enabling them to complement transnational engagement with the resources and social remittances that accrue from being well-established in the host society. We can therefore expect countries with partially integrated migrants to be more susceptible to voice after exit.[30]

These indicators of migration intensity and migrant profiles take us a long way toward understanding the conditions under which migrants are likely to exercise voice after exit, but they are not sufficient. We also need to examine the nature and degree of diaspora outreach by the sending states, which will shape the incentives and political opportunity structures for migrants.[31] Many new democracies have participated in a global shift in official discourse from vilifying emigrants as traitors to glorifying them as heroes of the nation (Castles 2007; Iskander 2010; Mohan 2008; Nieswand 2009; M. P. Smith and Bakker 2008; Solomon 2009). This discursive turn has been accompanied by the creation of state institutions and programs designed to encourage loyalty after exit, even in countries without high migration intensity. Although some of these changes have also occurred in authoritarian regimes such as China, Morocco, and Vietnam, they have been reinforced in new democracies by the search for democratic legitimacy and the need to compete for the vote of migrant households. Particularly when combined with reforms that grant political rights to migrants and/or outreach by political parties (see Chapter 3),

---

[30] The inclination of migrants to engage in post-exit voice is also likely to be affected by legal status. On the one hand, undocumented workers often earn less, have fewer opportunities to travel back home, and may be more consumed with the daily struggle of surviving in the host country. On the other hand, their inability to integrate fully into the host society may reinforce their inclination to remain actively engaged with their communities of origin, particularly if they become mobilized by migrant leaders who enjoy the advantages of legal status.

[31] In some cases, this outreach is encouraged and/or complemented by initiatives by the host-country governments (e.g., co-development programs in Europe) and/or international development agencies such as the World Bank, the UNDP, and the Inter-American Development Bank.

these innovations have the potential to alter the bargaining relationship between migrants and the state, as well as diversifying the points of political access for migrants.

One recent study covering 30 developing countries identifies diaspora institutions in 14 of the countries in my sample (Agunias 2009). Three of them (Benin, Lebanon, and Mali) have "hybrid" ministries that combine diaspora affairs with other sectors, and nine of them (Albania, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Romania, and Uruguay) have subministry-level diaspora institutions, usually within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Several countries in the study also have diaspora institutions that report directly to the president (Chile, Mexico, Philippines, Sierra Leone), legislative committees dedicated to diaspora affairs (Philippines), and/or subnational offices of migrant affairs (Mexico). There is also evidence of diaspora outreach institutions in other countries in my sample. A study by the International Organization for Migration (Ionescu 2006) finds specialized government agencies directed at diasporas in Benin, Bulgaria, Guatemala, and Senegal, as well as policy initiatives aimed at cultivating migrant loyalty in Cape Verde, Indonesia, Kenya, and Ukraine.[32] In addition, Ecuador established a National Migrant Office in 2007 (Gallina 2007); Ghana formed a Non-Resident Ghanaian Secretariat in 2003 and a new "hybrid" Ministry of Tourism and Diasporian Relations in 2006 (Nieswand 2009); and Macedonia has an Agency of Emigrants (Van Selm 2007).[33]

In addition to these agencies, a few countries in Latin America and Africa have created quasi-government advisory councils composed of government officials and migrant representatives to consult the government on diaspora-related issues. In Mexico,

---

[32] In 2001, the government of Cape Verde created the Institute of Communities "as a national information dissemination center for national policies regarding Diaspora-State relations" (Watkins 2010, 43).
[33] Government officials from Moldova supported a resolution issued by the IV Moldovan Diaspora Congress in 2010 to create a specialized state agency on the diaspora, as well as a diaspora advisory council (IOM 2010). As of August 2011, however, I have not found any evidence of follow-up by the government.

the government created the Consultative Council of the Institute for Mexican Abroad (CCIME) in 2003 to make recommendations to the Mexican government on migration-related issues. The CCIME has 125 members from the United States and Canada who are elected to serve three-year terms (Gonzalez Gutierrez 2009). In the Dominican Republic, migrant representatives appointed by the president serve on Consultative Committees to the Presidency of Dominicans Abroad (CCPDE).[34] In 2008, these committees were formally integrated into a newly-formed National Council for Dominican Communities Abroad (CONDEX), which was tasked with receiving policy recommendations from the migrants and directing them to the appropriate government ministries (Bouvier 2009). Finally, in Peru and Uruguay, the foreign ministries created Consultative Councils composed of elected migrant representatives in 2001 and 2008, respectively.[35]

The other examples of advisory councils are in Africa. In 1993, the Malian government created the High Council of Malians Abroad (HCME) "to represent diaspora interests before government authorities" (Macalou 2009, 76). HCME members are elected for five-year terms by over 50 national councils consisting of migrant associations, civil-society groups, and national federations in the country of residence (Macalou 2009, 79).[36] In Senegal, the government created a High Council of Senegalese Abroad (HCSE) composed of migrant representatives appointed by the president in the late 1990s (Diatta and Mbow 1999, 250; Vengroff 2007, 105). In 2008, the HCSE

---

[34] The first CCPDE was formed in New York in 2005, followed in 2006 by another six in the United States (Miami, New Jersey, Philadelphia, Chicago, Boston, and Puerto Rico) and eight in Europe (Berlin, Benelux, Madrid, Barcelona, France, Italy, and Switzerland). As of August 2011, however, the CONDEX website listed only eleven CCPDE (Germany, Benelux, Catalonia, Chicago, Florida, France, Italy, Madrid, Massachusetts, New York, and Puerto Rico).

[35] http://www.consejodeconsulta.com/consecon/; http://www.uruguayos.fr/Reglamento-de-los-Consejos.

[36] Malian migrants also sit on an Economic, Social, and Cultural Council with other civil society representatives (DPADM 2004).

became the Supreme Council of Senegalese Abroad (CSSE) and was restructured to set aside 30 out of 65 seats for delegates elected by Senegalese migrant associations (CSSE website). Finally, the Liberian Embassy in Washington, DC created a Diaspora Advisory Board (LDAB) in 2009 composed of candidates chosen by the Ambassador to "harness resources of the Liberian diaspora" and help the government design and implement Liberia's Poverty Reduction Strategy, including programs aimed at enhancing governance and the rule of law (*The Liberian Journal*, 25 February 2009).

Combining diaspora outreach with the socio-economic variables in Table 1.3, I have constructed an ideal-type of a new democracy that is most likely to be susceptible to voice after exit. Besides having high migration intensity and a significant share of its university-educated population living abroad, the ideal-type's migrants would be well-educated but politically disenfranchised males who have spent many years living in immigrant enclaves in OECD countries. At the same time, diaspora outreach by the home government would consist of high-level institutions dedicated to migrant affairs, including advisory councils with migrant representation. To get a sense of where the 41 new democracies in my sample stand in relation to the ideal-type, Table 1.4 scores them as either "1" or "0" on nine related indicators, with 14 countries (34 percent) receiving a positive score on at least half of them.[37] The countries that come closest to the ideal-type are Mexico and the Dominican Republic, followed by El Salvador and Lebanon. The other high-scoring countries are Albania, Cape Verde, Ecuador, Guatemala, Guyana, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, the Philippines, and Senegal. At the other end of the continuum are

[37] It is worth noting that there is a very weak correlation between the socio-economic and state outreach variables ($R^2 = .1026$), which suggests that the creation of diaspora outreach institutions is not merely a function of the socio-economic weight of a country's migrants.

Indonesia, Bulgaria, Latvia, Chile, Paraguay, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Zambia, which receive a positive score on fewer than three indicators.

[insert Table 1.4 about here]

If my hypotheses about susceptibility to voice after exit are correct, we can expect migrants from the higher-scoring countries to have more impact on politics back home. The next four chapters of this book show that this expectation is largely borne out by the empirical evidence. At the same time, however, these scores miss some of the nuance and complexity inherent in migrant profiles, diaspora outreach, and voice after exit. First, not all of the socio-economic indicators will have the same impact on migrant influence. For example, under conditions of high migration intensity and OECD concentration but low integration and weak diaspora outreach (e.g., Albania, Guatemala, Honduras), migrant influence is likely to be diffuse rather than concentrated and to occur primarily through the indirect effects of loyalty rather than the direct exercise of voice. By the same token, countries without high migration intensity but with migrant profiles conducive to transnational organizing (e.g., Turkey, Kenya, Mali) are likely to be more susceptible to concentrated influence, particularly if their governments engage in substantial diaspora outreach.

Second, the binary measures of diaspora outreach do not tell us anything about its scope, content, or inclusiveness. Outreach institutions vary significantly with regard to their resources and authority, as well as their commitment to going beyond symbolic gestures to give migrants real support and influence. In addition, they have diverse priorities that may include attracting financial flows, encouraging return migration by high-skilled workers, leveraging remittances for community development, and/or trying

to control the terms of migrant engagement with their home countries. As discussed in Chapter 4, the latter is particularly prevalent among the migrant advisory councils. While providing openings for migrant influence, they often suffer from the same democratic deficits as the political systems in which they are embedded. If voice after exit is captured by the state or political parties (leading to "controlled voice" rather than "autonomous voice"), it is unlikely to have a positive impact on democratic deepening.

Third, there are complex feedback effects between voice after exit and the availability of formal channels for its exercise. As explained in detail in Chapter 3, external voting rights are a particularly striking example of this dynamic. In countries such as Cape Verde, Peru, and Senegal, external voting rights were granted with little pressure from migrants but ended up altering the political strategies and/or electoral fortunes of domestic politicians. The story is quite different in countries such as Mexico and the Philippines (and possibly El Salvador and Kenya), where migrant activists lobbied successfully for the right to vote from abroad, only to experience disappointing turn-out by their compatriots on election day.[38] No longer engaged in a struggle for voting rights, these migrants were paradoxically *demobilized* by the availability of this new channel for voice after exit, at least in the short run.[39]

Finally, different kinds of migrants can be expected to choose different types of voice after exit. For example, external voting is most prevalent among migrants from countries whose political parties have the resources and/or incentives to mobilize the

---

[38] As discussed in Chapter 3, the low turn-out in Mexico and the Philippines can be attributed to a combination of administrative obstacles to voter participation and a lack of interest and/or information in the migrant community. Kenya's 2010 Constitution mandates the provision of external voting rights, and El Salvador may pass voting rights legislation in the near future.

[39] There is an interesting parallel with democratization in general, whereby civil society organizations are key actors in the struggle for regime change but then experience demobilization once democratic elections are put into place. See, e.g., (Friedman 2000; Oxhorn 1995).

diaspora (e.g., Cape Verde, Dominican Republic, Senegal). By contrast, migrants from countries with weak diaspora outreach by either the state or the dominant parties (e.g., Ghana, Guyana, Lebanon, Liberia, Turkey) are more inclined to finance minority parties and/or lobby on specific issues (including, in some cases, external voting rights), particularly if they are well-educated and from divided societies. Meanwhile, rural-to-urban migrants from countries with development-oriented diaspora outreach and some degree of decentralization (e.g., El Salvador, Mali, Mexico, Philippines) often focus on co-financing public goods with local governments rather than engaging directly in electoral politics.[40] As we will see in subsequent chapters, these different types of engagement have different implications for democratic deepening back home.

Organization of the Book

In the remainder of this book, I explore the impact of migration on three outcomes of critical importance to the quality of democracy: electoral participation, non-electoral civic engagement, and accountability. For each outcome, I examine the behavior of non-migrants (as affected by loyalty after exit) and migrants (as manifested through voice after exit). Given the lack of systematic data on migrant influence in sending countries, I combine original research in Mexico with a critical review of existing studies on how migrants are shaping politics in the new democracies in this study. As will become clear, some countries have received significantly more attention than others, raising concerns

[40] I do not mean to imply that migrants from the same country engage in only one form of voice after exit. For example, as described in Chapter 3, migrants from El Salvador, Mexico, and the Philippines have also lobbied aggressively for the right to vote from abroad, as well as actively supporting parties and/or candidates back home. Likewise, as described in Chapter 4, we also find intermittent examples of migrant co-financing of local public goods in Bolivia, Cape Verde, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, and Turkey.

about the generalizability of the findings. Nonetheless, this book offers an invaluable starting point for engaging in more systematic analysis of migrant influence on politics in new democracies. By putting my in-depth analysis of the Mexican case in comparative context, I begin to identify the conditions under which migrants are likely to exercise loyalty and/or voice after exit, as well as the impact of their engagement on the quality of democracy back home. I also reveal the many gaps in our knowledge and thereby lay out a research agenda for other scholars.

Chapter 2: Political Impact of Loyalty after Exit

In this chapter, I explore how loyalty after exit, in the form of economic and social remittances, is indirectly shaping political engagement and accountability in new democracies. I begin with a review of the existing literature, which examines the impact of migration and remittances on voter turnout, attitudes about democracy, non-electoral political activities, membership in civic organizations, partisanship, and accountability. While several studies find that economic and social remittances have a harmful impact on voter turn-out and political attitudes among non-migrants, as well as mixed effects on accountability, the results are more encouraging with regard to non-electoral forms of participation, particularly membership in civic associations. I then test these findings further using an original dataset of 1,505 household surveys conducted in the Mexican states of Michoacán and Zacatecas in 2008, arriving at very similar conclusions.

I conclude the chapter with a discussion of how loyalty after exit may be shaping the interaction between political engagement and accountability in high-migration new democracies. On the one hand, the disengagement of migrant households from electoral

politics does not bode well for vertical accountability. On the other hand, their greater inclination to belong to civic organizations and make demands on public officials through non-electoral channels has positive implications for societal accountability. A major weakness of these findings, however, is that they are based almost exclusively on data from Latin America, particularly Mexico. It is therefore imperative that this research be extended to new democracies in other regions.

Chapter 3: Direct Participation in Electoral Politics

Although most migrants do not translate loyalty into voice to become directly engaged in politics back home, we find widespread evidence of campaign financing, political party activism, lobbying for external political rights, and/or expatriate voting by migrants from new democracies. In this chapter, I conduct a comparative review of these activities in the countries in my study. Using external voting rights (or the lack thereof) as my thematic anchor, I find that the extent and nature of migrant engagement in electoral politics back home depends largely on the interaction between (1) the socio-economic weight of migrants; and (2) the nature of political parties and the party system in the home country. I conclude the chapter with a discussion of the implications of each type of participation for democratic representation and accountability, with particular attention to the role of migrant leaders in aggregating interests and influencing policy. Among the questions I consider are (1) what sets these activist migrants apart from the majority who either remain silent or exercise voice only in the host country? (2) whose interests are being represented? and (3) to what extent is voice after exit challenging entrenched power structures in new democracies?

Chapter 4: Non-Electoral Engagement and Collective Remittances

In this chapter, I turn to non-electoral forms of voice after exit, specifically (1) lobbying home-country governments on non-electoral issues; (2) participating in migrant advisory councils; and (3) mobilizing collective remittances to finance public goods back home, sometimes in collaboration with public officials. While acknowledging that all three kinds of engagement can take place on an individualized basis, I focus on the collective exercise of non-electoral voice, either by migrants who are (ostensibly) representing the broader community or by transnational migrant organizations. The bulk of the chapter is devoted to a comparative review of these activities in the countries in my study, particularly the type and prevalence of migrant organizations that send collective remittances.

As in Chapter 3, I find that the extent and nature of voice after exit depends largely on the interaction between the socio-economic profile of the migrants and the institutional terrain in their home countries. Of particular importance for non-electoral engagement are (1) the origins and education levels of the migrants; (2) the nature and prevalence of social cleavages in the country of origin; and (3) legacies of state-society relations back home. Elaborating on the aforementioned distinction between autonomous voice and controlled voice, I conclude with a discussion of how migrants from different countries have responded to the perennial tension between maintaining their autonomy and gaining access to resources and influence.

Chapter 5: Migrants as Agents of Societal Accountability

In this chapter, I explore the conditions under which migrants are likely to enhance societal accountability in new democracies. I begin with a discussion of how their control of financial resources, distance from clientelistic networks, and experiences living in societies with stronger mechanisms of accountability endow them, at least potentially, with unique advantages as agents of accountability. After unpacking the concept of accountability further to explore the various ways in which migrants might have an impact, I review case study evidence from Mexico, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Ghana, Mali, and the Philippines regarding the efforts of organized migrants to hold public officials accountable during the implementation of local projects.

I devote the rest of the chapter to a systematic, micro-level analysis of the conditions under which migrant hometown associations (HTAs) are likely to act as agents of societal accountability in their communities of origin. Drawing on an original dataset constructed from key informant interviews and household surveys in 60 Mexican communities with projects co-financed by HTAs and the government under Mexico's innovative 3x1 Program, I use both qualitative and quantitative methods to explore this question. My main finding is that HTAs are most likely to enhance accountability when they are embedded in translocal networks that include local residents, although relations between HTAs and the local government also matter. I conclude with a discussion of the implications of my findings for cross-national research on migration and accountability.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

After summarizing the key findings of Chapters 2 through 5, I revisit the hypotheses developed in Chapter 1 regarding the susceptibility of new democracies to post-exit loyalty and voice. Specfically, I explore whether they are supported by the available evidence regarding actual levels of engagement and influence by migrants from these countries. I then offer some broad conclusions regarding the socio-economic, institutional, and cultural conditions under which loyalty and voice after exit are likely to have a positive impact on democratic deepening. I also discuss the importance of migrant agency, particularly leadership and learning, to these outcomes. I conclude with a discussion of the implications of loyalty and voice after exit for the quality of democracy in the context of shifting conceptions of democratic citizenship.

Table 1.1. New Democracies by Region and Selected Indicators

Region and Country	Population (2009)	Income Category[41]	Polity Score (2009)	Years since Transition[42]	Average Polity Score
EAP	**160,973,913**		**8**	**17**	**7.55**
Indonesia	229,964,723	LMC	8	11	7.09
Philippines	91,983,102	LMC	8	23	8.00
ECA	**20,118,503**		**8**	**19**	**7.54**
Albania	3,155,271	LMC	9	13	7.00
Bulgaria	7,585,131	UMC	9	20	8.45
Latvia	2,255,128	UMC	8	19	8.00
Macedonia	2,042,484	UMC	9	19	7.26
Moldova	3,603,506	LMC	8	19	7.26
Romania	21,482,395	UMC	9	14	7.40
Turkey	74,815,703	UMC	7	27	7.44
Ukraine	46,008,406	LMC	7	19	6.47
LAC	**29,278,979**		**8**	**21**	**7.88**
Argentina	40,276,376	UMC	8	27	7.63
Bolivia	9,862,860	LMC	7	28	8.61
Brazil	193,733,795	UMC	8	25	7.88
Chile	16,970,265	UMC	10	21	8.67
Dom. Rep.	10,090,151	UMC	8	14	8.00
Ecuador	13,625,069	LMC	5	31	7.81
El Salvador	6,163,050	LMC	8	16	7.06
Guatemala	14,026,947	LMC	8	14	8.00
Guyana	762,498	LMC	6	18	6.00
Honduras	7,465,998	LMC	7	28	6.25
Mexico	107,431,225	UMC	8	13	7.54
Nicaragua	5,742,800	LMC	9	20	7.65
Panama	3,453,898	UMC	9	21	8.76
Paraguay	6,348,917	LMC	8	18	7.33
Peru	29,164,883	UMC	9	9	9.00
Uruguay	3,344,938	UMC	10	25	9.84
MNA	**4,223,553**		**7**	**5**	**7.00**
Lebanon	4,223,553	UMC	7	5	7.00
SAS	**29,330,505**		**6**	**4**	**6.00**
Nepal	29,330,505	LIC	6	4	6.00

[41] [1]World Bank classification based on 2008 GNI per capita: low income (LIC) = $975 or less; lower middle income (LMC) = $976 – $3,855; and upper middle income (UMC) = $3,856 – $11,905.
[42] [2]Modified version of Polity's regime duration score.

Region and Country	Population (2009)	Income Category	Polity Score (2009)	Years since Transition	Average Polity Score
SSA	**13,494,494**		**7**	**13**	**6.89**
Benin	8,934,985	LIC	7	19	6.22
Cape Verde	505,606	LMC	n.d.	19	n.d.
Comoros	659,098	LIC	9	8	7.00
Ghana	23,837,261	LIC	8	9	7.33
Kenya	39,802,015	LIC	7	8	7.63
Lesotho	2,066,919	LIC	8	17	6.82
Liberia	3,954,979	LIC	6	4	6.00
Mali	13,010,209	LIC	7	18	6.72
Namibia	2,171,137	UMC	6	20	6.00
Senegal	12,534,228	LIC	7	10	7.70
Sierra Leone	5,696,471	LIC	7	8	5.75
South Africa	49,320,150	UMC	9	16	9.00
Zambia	12,935,368	LIC	7	9	5.44
ALL	**28,301,024**		**8**	**17**	**7.43**

Sources: (Marshall and Jaggers 2009; World Bank 2010b, 2011).

Table 1.2. Indicators of Migration Intensity

Region and Country	Emigration Rate (2010)	Remittances ($US mil, 2007)	Rem/ GDP (2007)	Migration Intensity Index*
EAP	**5.2**	**11,233**	**6.6**	**58.5**
Indonesia	1.1	6,174	1.5	43.0
Philippines	9.3	16,291	11.6	74.1
ECA	**18.8**	**2,465**	**8.7**	**63.7**
Albania	45.4	1,071	10.1	76.5
Bulgaria	16.0	2,086	5.7	65.7
Latvia	12.2	552	2.1	52.3
Macedonia	21.9	267	3.6	58.0
Moldova	21.5	1,498	38.3	83.1
Romania	13.1	8,533	5.6	68.6
Turkey	5.6	1,209	0.2	40.4
Ukraine	14.4	4,503	3.9	64.6
LAC	**10.8**	**3,378**	**7.6**	**54.9**
Argentina	2.4	604	0.2	32.7
Bolivia	6.8	927	6.6	57.8
Brazil	0.7	4,382	0.3	34.2
Chile	3.7	3	0.0	17.3
Dom. Rep.	10.1	3,414	9.3	67.8
Ecuador	8.3	3,094	6.9	63.5
El Salvador	20.5	3,711	18.4	79.3
Guatemala	6.1	4,254	10.6	65.9
Guyana	56.8	278	23.5	81.1
Honduras	7.5	2,625	24.5	73.0
Mexico	10.7	27,144	3.0	66.3
Nicaragua	12.5	740	12.1	66.6
Panama	4.0	180	0.8	35.6
Paraguay	7.9	469	3.2	51.3
Peru	3.7	2,131	1.9	47.5
Uruguay	10.5	97	0.4	38.2
MNA	**15.6**	**5,769**	**24.4**	**81.0**
Lebanon	15.6	5,769	24.4	81.0
SAS	**3.3**	**1,734**	**15.5**	**62.0**
Nepal	3.3	1,734	15.5	62.0

Region and Country	Emigration Rate (2010)	Remittances ($US mil, 2007)	Rem/ GDP (2007)	Migration Index*
SSA	**8.1**	**368**	**5.6**	**44.1**
Benin	5.8	224	4.1	48.4
Cape Verde	37.5	139	9.2	67.5
Comoros	5.6	12	2.6	35.7
Ghana	3.4	117	0.8	33.2
Kenya	1.1	1,588	5.4	47.2
Lesotho	20.5	443	28.7	76.2
Liberia	10.5	65	0.1	34.6
Mali	7.6	212	3.3	48.6
Namibia	0.7	17	0.2	15.5
Senegal	4.9	925	8.5	57.5
Sierra Leone	4.6	148	9.4	52.0
South Africa	1.7	834	0.3	32.6
Zambia	1.4	59	0.5	24.3
ALL	**11.1**	**2,647**	**7.7**	**54.2**

Sources: (World Bank 2010a, 2011); for Philippines, (CFO 2011). *Composite index based on emigration rate (2010), total remittances (2007), and remittances as share of GDP (2007) adjusted for the natural log of the highest value in each category.

Table 1.3. Selected Indicators of Migrant Socio-Economic Profiles by Country of Origin[43]

	Emigrant Stocks (2010)[44]		Educational Attainment Levels (% of all migrants 15+ years old in OECD, 2000)				(2000)	(2007)	Migrants Living in OECD (2000)[45]			
Region/ Country	% OECD	Concentration Index (OECD)[46]	% Primary	% Secondary	% Tertiary	Attainment Index[47]	Tertiary Rate[48]	% Refugees	% Women	Duration Index	Naturalization Rate (%)	Partial Integration
EAP	**36.9**	**61.0**	**21.1**	**36.7**	**40.2**	**58.6**	**8.2**	**0.3**	**56.7**	**65.6**	**65.1**	**0**
Indonesia	16.4	52.2	24.8	38.3	34.5	53.7	2.9	0.5	53.0	61.1	68.2	
Philippines	57.5	69.9	17.4	35.1	45.9	63.5	13.5	0.0	60.5	70.1	61.9	
ECA	**61.9**	**57.3**	**43.4**	**33.0**	**19.4**	**35.9**	**11.3**	**1.0**	**49.9**	**51.8**	**43.5**	**2**
Albania	92.5	79.1	54.0	34.6	8.7	26.0	17.4	1.1	41.5	38.8	5.7	
Bulgaria	41.5	48.4	51.0	31.3	13.0	28.7	9.6	0.2	54.0	44.0	28.3	
Latvia	47.1	42.5	19.5	36.1	35.8	53.9	8.5	0.3	51.4	69.8	73.5	
Macedonia	86.7	47.4	57.1	24.4	7.4	19.6	29.4	1.8	49.1	54.5	44.3	
Moldova	22.9	63.5	26.8	37.4	34.6	53.3	4.1	0.8	52.0	81.7	28.8	√
Romania	91.9	55.6	32.7	43.9	22.3	44.3	11.2	0.2	50.9	41.0	53.9	
Turkey	92.1	76.4	69.0	21.6	6.7	17.5	5.8	3.4	47.3	72.7	43.3	√
Ukraine	21.0	45.3	36.8	34.8	27.0	44.4	4.3	0.4	53.2	56.6	70.1	
LAC	**73.1**	**82.1**	**40.8**	**37.3**	**20.8**	**39.4**	**18.7**	**0.2**	**52.8**	**67.0**	**42.5**	**5**
Argentina	62.6	74.7	31.1	34.8	32.6	50.0	2.8	0.1	51.8	70.6	57.5	
Bolivia	55.5	85.8	24.9	44.1	29.4	51.5	5.8	0.1	52.1	63.7	39.0	√
Brazil	84.3	52.7	30.6	38.8	25.9	45.3	2.0	0.1	59.8	54.8	24.9	
Chile	51.1	47.7	25.1	41.8	29.9	50.8	6.0	0.2	51.7	74.4	55.0	
Dom. Rep.	94.2	90.4	53.2	34.2	12.3	29.4	22.4	0.0	56.9	67.2	38.3	√
Ecuador	93.5	77.5	48.8	35.8	15.0	32.9	9.5	0.1	50.1	55.5	23.9	

[43] Excludes OECD members still considered to be developing countries (Chile, Mexico, Turkey).

[44] For the Philippines, I am using 2009 data from the Commission on Filipinos Overseas because it includes temporary overseas workers.

[45] The duration index is a weighted average of the share of migrants by duration of residence in the host country; the naturalization rate is the share of migrants in OECD countries with citizenship of the host country; and partial integration applies to countries with a duration index above the sample average but a naturalization rate below the sample average.

[46] Weighted average of the share of OECD-based migrants in the top three OECD destinations.

[47] Primary includes people who have completed lower secondary school. The attainment index is a weighted average of the three levels of educational attainment.

[48] Share of the population with at least one year of tertiary education living abroad in an OECD country.

Region/ Country	% OECD	Concentration Index (OECD)	% Primary	% Secondary	% Tertiary	Attainment Index	Tertiary Rate	% Refugees	% Women	Duration Index	Naturalization Rate (%)	Partial Integration
El Salvador	94.6	95.9	62.9	29.2	7.7	22.3	31.7	0.4	48.7	65.3	30.4	√
Guatemala	90.3	97.5	63.6	27.9	8.4	22.4	23.9	0.7	44.5	61.9	26.1	
Guyana	90.9	86.1	31.0	42.9	25.0	46.5	89.2	0.2	54.2	71.9	68.1	
Honduras	89.0	96.5	57.2	32.2	10.6	26.7	24.8	0.2	50.9	58.1	28.1	
Mexico	99.4	99.1	69.6	24.7	5.7	18.1	15.5	0.1	44.4	64.6	25.3	√
Nicaragua	37.1	94.0	40.7	41.1	18.1	38.7	30.2	0.2	54.3	71.1	37.1	√
Panama	77.8	93.1	16.9	50.0	32.9	57.9	16.7	0.1	60.3	80.1	69.6	
Paraguay	23.9	81.1	37.1	37.5	23.9	42.7	3.8	0.0	57.8	73.4	55.0	
Peru	74.4	67.3	24.7	44.8	28.6	51.0	5.8	0.6	55.1	61.6	37.0	
Uruguay	50.9	74.6	34.7	37.0	26.3	44.8	9.0	0.1	51.4	77.0	64.9	
MNA	**77.0**	**40.9**	**33.8**	**31.6**	**30.9**	**46.7**	**43.8**	**2.4**	**44.2**	**74.6**	**77.9**	**0**
Lebanon	77.0	40.9	33.80	31.60	30.9	46.7	43.8	2.4	44.2	74.6	77.9	
SAS	**10.6**	**61.8**	**21.3**	**33.0**	**39.2**	**55.7**	**4.0**	**0.5**	**36.8**	**43.4**	**16.2**	**0**
Nepal	10.6	61.8	21.3	33.0	39.2	55.7	4.0	0.5	36.8	43.4	16.2	
SSA	**37.8**	**65.3**	**34.4**	**31.2**	**31.6**	**47.2**	**27.0**	**2.7**	**47.6**	**62.4**	**46.3**	**3**
Benin	4.9	75.8	25.8	30.5	42.2	57.5	8.6	0.1	42.4	69.6	59.4	
Cape Verde	71.1	62.7	73.7	19.1	5.9	15.5	82.4	0.0	54.6	70.6	37.1	√
Comoros	71.2	98.3	63.6	25.6	10.7	23.5	20.7	0.7	48.7	64.9	67.5	
Ghana	44.1	52.8	26.5	38.4	31.3	50.5	44.6	1.8	44.5	54.7	34.5	
Kenya	66.4	71.9	26.0	32.7	36.9	53.3	38.5	2.1	52.1	62.6	50.8	
Lesotho	0.4	40.5	18.3	31.6	45.8	61.6	4.1	0.0	52.3	62.6	62.1	
Liberia	19.8	82.2	20.6	44.8	33.5	55.9	44.3	16.6	51.0	58.0	33.8	
Mali	9.7	85.3	68.3	18.7	12.6	22.0	14.7	0.3	33.8	68.8	22.8	√
Namibia	38.4	41.4	15.3	34.8	45.9	63.3	3.4	5.6	58.1	52.2	43.5	
South Africa	40.1	63.8	56.6	23.6	19.1	30.9	17.1	2.6	33.9	66.3	36.4	√
Senegal	24.9	56.1	23.5	37.4	33.7	52.4	49.2	0.3	56.7	65.6	65.1	
Sierra Leone	69.2	48.6	14.6	34.6	44.8	62.1	7.4	5.8	45.8	55.6	31.7	
Zambia	30.5	69.8	14.2	34.4	47.9	65.1	16.4	0.0	51.1	61.9	63.4	
ALL	**52.3**	**69.4**	**37.6**	**34.3**	**25.6**	**42.7**	**19.6**	**0.1**	**51.0**	**64.1**	**59.3**	**10**

Sources: (CFO 2011; UNDP 2009; World Bank 2010a, 2011).

Table 1.4. New Democracies Relative to Ideal-Type of Susceptibility to Voice after Exit*

Region and Country	High MI	High Educational Attainment	High % Tertiary	High % OECD	High OECD Concentration	Male-Dominated	Partial Integration	National Outreach	Advisory Council	Score
EAP										**3.5**
Indonesia		√						√		2
Philippines	√	√		√	√			√		5
ECA										**3.3**
Albania	√			√	√	√		√		5
Bulgaria	√							√		2
Latvia		√								1
Macedonia	√		√	√		√				4
Moldova	√	√					√			3
Romania	√	√		√				√		4
Turkey				√	√	√	√			4
Ukraine	√	√						√		3
LAC										**4.3**
Argentina		√		√	√					3
Bolivia	√	√			√		√			4
Brazil		√		√				√		3
Chile		√						√		2
Dom. Rep.	√		√	√	√		√	√	√	7
Ecuador	√			√	√			√		5
El Salvador	√		√	√	√	√	√	√		6
Guatemala	√		√	√	√	√		√		5
Guyana	√	√	√	√	√					5
Honduras	√		√	√	√					4
Mexico	√			√	√	√	√	√	√	7
Nicaragua	√		√		√		√			4
Panama		√		√	√					3
Paraguay					√					2
Peru		√		√				√	√	4
Uruguay		√			√			√	√	4

Region and Country	High MI	High Educational Attainment	High % Tertiary	High % OECD	High OECD Concentration	Male-Dominated	Partial Integration	National Outreach	Advisory Council	Score
MNA										**6.0**
Lebanon	√	√	√	√		√		√		6
SAS										**3.0**
Nepal	√	√				√				3
SSA										**3.7**
Benin		√			√	√		√		4
Cape Verde	√		√	√			√	√		5
Comoros			√	√	√	√				4
Ghana		√	√			√		√		4
Kenya		√	√	√	√			√		5
Lesotho	√	√								2
Liberia		√	√		√			√	√	5
Mali					√	√	√	√	√	5
Namibia										1
Senegal	√	√				√	√	√	√	5
Sierra Leone		√	√			√		√		4
South Africa				√						2
Zambia		√			√					2

*Countries receive a high score in Columns 1-5 if the relevant indicator is above the sample average.

REFERENCES

Ackerman, John. 2004. "Co-Governance for Accountability: Beyond 'Exit' and 'Voice'." *World Development* 32(3): 447-463.

Agüero, Felipe, and Jeffrey Stark, eds. 1998. *Fault lines of democracy in post-transition Latin America*. Miami: North-South Center Press/University of Miami.

Agunias, Dovelyn R., ed. 2009. *Closing the distance: how governments strengthen ties with their diasporas*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.

Almond, Gabriel Abraham, and Sidney Verba. 1963. *The civic culture: political attitudes and democracy in five nations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Asis, Maruja M.B. 2006. "Desenvolviendo la caja de balikbayan: los filipinos en el extranjero y su país de origen." In *Relaciones Estado diáspora: aproximaciones desde cuatro continentes*, ed. Carlos Gonzalez Gutierrez. Mexico, DF: Miguel Ángel Porrua, UAZ, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior.

Baiocchi, Gianpaolo, Patrick Heller, and Marcelo Kunrath Silva. 2008. "Making Space for Civil Society: Institutional Reforms and Local Democracy in Brazil." *Social Forces* 86(3): 911-936.

Barry, Brian. 1974. "Review Article: ?Exit, Voice, and Loyalty?" *British Journal of Political Science* 4(01): 79-107.

Bastia, Tanja. 2007. "From Mining to Garment Workshops: Bolivian Migrants in Buenos Aires." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 33(4): 655-669.

Bates, Robert H. 1981. *Markets and states in tropical Africa: the political basis of agricultural policies*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Beck, Linda Jane. 2008. *Brokering democracy in Africa: the rise of clientelist democracy in Senegal*. New York: Macmillan.

Blake, Charles H., and Stephen D. Morris. 2009. *Corruption and democracy in Latin America*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Böcker, Anita, and Dietrich Thränhardt. 2006. "Multiple citizenship and naturalization: An evaluation of German and Dutch policies." *Journal of International Migration and Integration / Revue de l'integration et de la migration internationale* 7(1): 71-94.

Bouvier, Cassandre. 2009. *La diáspora dominicana. Una movilización por hacerse*. Paris: Enda Europa y Enda República Dominicana. Estudio.

Bratton, Michael, Robert B. Mattes, and Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi. 2005. *Public opinion, democracy, and market reform in Africa*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Burgess, Katrina. 2009. "Neoliberal Reform and Migrant Remittances: Symptom or Solution?" In *Beyond neoliberalism in Latin America?: societies and politics at the crossroads*, eds. John Burdick, Philip Oxhorn, and Kenneth M. Roberts. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Caglar, Ayse. 2006. "Hometown associations, the rescaling of state spatiality and migrant grassroots transnationalism." *Global Networks* 6(1): 1-22.

Castles, Stephen. 2007. "Comparing the Experience of Five Major Emigration Countries." In *Working Paper No. 7*, Oxford: International Migration Institute, University of Oxford.

Castles, Stephen, and Mark J. Miller. 2009. *The Age of Migration*. 4th ed. New York: Palgrave USA.

CFO. 2011. *Stock Estimate of Overseas Filipinos*. Manila: Commission on Filipinos Overseas. http://uc.87.sl.pt.

Córdova, Abigail, and Jonathan T. Hiskey. 2010. "Migrant Networks and Democracy in Latin America." In Los Angeles: UCLA Migration Studies Group, UCLA.

Cunhill Grau, Nuria. 2003. *Responsabilización por el Control Social*. Costa Rica: FLACSO.

Dahl, Robert Alan. 1971. *Polyarchy: participation and opposition*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Diamond, Larry Jay. 1999. *Developing democracy: toward consolidation*. Balitmore: JHU Press.

Diamond, Larry Jay, and Leonardo Morlino. 2005. *Assessing the quality of democracy*. Balitmore: JHU Press.

Diamond, Larry Jay, Andreas Schedler, and Marc F. Plattner. 1999. "Introduction." In *The self-restraining state: power and accountability in new democracies*, eds. Andreas Schedler, Larry Jay Diamond, and Marc F. Plattner. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Diatta, Marie Angelique, and Ndiaga Mbow. 1999. "Releasing the Development Potential of Return Migration: The Case of Senegal." *International Migration* 37(1): 243-266.

DPADM. 2004. *Republic of Mali: Public Administration Country Profile*. New York, NY: United Nations, Division for Public Administration and Development Management, Department of Economic and Social Affairs.

Fox, Jonathan. 2007. *Accountability politics: power and voice in rural Mexico*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

———. 2005. *Mapping Mexican Civil Society*. Background paper prepared for Mexican Migrant Civic Participation.

Friedman, Elisabeth J. 2000. *Unfinished transitions: women and the gendered development of democracy in Venezuela, 1936-1996*. University Park: Penn State Press.

Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. *The end of history and the last man*. New York: Free Press.

Galatowitsch, Diane. 2009. *Co-development in Mali: A Case Study of a Development Phenomenon Exploited by Immigration Policy*. SIT Graduate Institute. Paper. http://digitalcollections.sit.edu/isp_collection/737.

Gallina, Andrea. 2007. "Migration and Development Linkage in Ecuador." In *Federico Caffe Centre Research Reports Nr. 3*, Roskilde, Denmark: Roskilde University.

Gammage, Sarah. 2004. "Exercising Exit, Voice and Loyalty: A Gender Perspective on Transnationalism in Haiti." *Development and Change* 35(4): 743-771.

Gaytán Olmedo, María Soledad. 2005. "Los comités ciudadanos de control y vigilancia del Estado de México." http://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=1465529 (Accessed August 31, 2011).

Goetz, Anne Marie, and Rob Jenkins. 2005. *Reinventing accountability: making democracy work for human development*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Goldring, Luin. 2001. "The Gender and Geography of Citizenship in Mexico-U.S. Transnational Spaces." *Identities* 7(4): 501-537.

Gonzalez Gutierrez, Carlos. 2009. "The Institute of Mexicans Abroad: An Effort to Empower the Diaspora." In *Closing the distance: how governments strengthen ties with their diasporas*, ed. Dovelyn Rannveig Agunias. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.

Gonzalez-Acosta, Edward. 2009. "The power of political parties: Political participation, clientelism, and remittances in the Dominican Republic." PhD dissertation. New School University.

Goodman, Gary L., and Jonathan T. Hiskey. 2008. "Exit without Leaving: Political Disengagement in High Migration Municipalities in Mexico." *Comparative Politics* 40(2): 169-188.

Grindle, Merilee Serrill. 2007. *Going local: decentralization, democratization, and the promise of good governance*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Guarnizo, Luis, Alejandro Portes, and William Haller. 2003. "Assimilation and Transnationalism: Determinants of Transnational Political Action among Contemporary Migrants." *American Journal of Sociology* 108(6): 1211-1248.

Hagopian, Frances. 1998. "Democracy and Political Representation in Latin America in the 1990s: Pause, Reorganization, or Decline?" In *Fault lines of democracy in post-transition Latin America*, eds. Felipe Agüero and Jeffrey Stark. Miami: North-South Center Press/University of Miami.

Hagopian, Frances, and Scott Mainwaring. 2005. *The third wave of democratization in Latin America: advances and setbacks*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hamilton, Nora, and Norma Stoltz Chinchilla. 2001. *Seeking community in a global city: Guatemalans and Salvadorans in Los Angeles*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Haynes, Jeffrey. 2001. *Democracy in the developing world: Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Hirschman, Albert O. 1993. "Exit, Voice, and the Fate of the German Democratic Republic: An Essay in Conceptual History." *World Politics* 45(2): 173-202.

Hoffmann, Bert. 2010. "Bringing Hirschman Back In: 'Exit', 'Voice', and 'Loyalty' in the Politics of Transnational Migration." *The Latin Americanist* 54(2): 57-73.

Holzner, Claudio A. 2010. *Poverty of Democracy: The Institutional Roots of Political Participation in Mexico*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. *The third wave: democratization in the late twentieth century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

Inglehart, Ronald. 2000. "Culture and Democracy." In *Culture matters: how values shape human progress*, eds. Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington. New York: Basic Books.

Inkeles, Alex. 1969. "Participant Citizenship in Six Developing Countries." *American Political Science Review* 63(4): 1120-1141.

IOM. 2010. *Moldovan Diaspora Outline Steps to Strengthen Relationship with Home Country*. Geneva: International Organization for Migration.

Ionescu, Dina. 2006. *Engaging Diasporas as Development Partners for Home and Destination Countries*. Geneva: International Organization for Migration.

Iskander, Natasha Nefertiti. 2010. *Creative State: Forty Years of Migration and Development Policy in Morocco and Mexico*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Jokisch, Brad, and Jason Pribilsky. 2002. "The Panic to Leave: Economic Crisis and the 'New Emigration' from Ecuador." *International Migration* 40(4): 75-102.

Jones-Correa, Michael. 1998. "Different Paths: Gender, Immigration and Political Participation." *International Migration Review* 32(2): 326-349.

Kandel, William, and Douglas S Massey. 2001. "Culture of Mexican Migration: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, The." *Social Forces* 80: 981.

Kapur, Devesh. 2010. *Diaspora, Development, and Democracy: The Domestic Impact of International Migration from India*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kitschelt, Herbert, and Steven Wilkinson. 2007. "Citizen-Politician Linkages: An Introduction." In *Patrons, clients, and policies: patterns of democratic accountability and political competition*, eds. Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson. Cambridge University Press.

Kivisto, Peter, and Thomas Faist. 2009. *Beyond a Border: The Causes and Consequences of Contemporary Immigration*. Pine Forge Press.

Krishna, Anirudh. 2008. *Poverty, participation, and democracy: a global perspective*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Landolt, Patricia, Lilian Autler, and Sonia Baires. 2001. "From Hermano Lejano to Hermano Mayor: the dialectics of Salvadoran transnationalism." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 22(2): 290-315.

Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan Way. 2010. *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Levitt, Peggy. 2001. *The transnational villagers*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Levitt, Peggy, and Deepak Lamba-Nieves. 2010. "It's Not Just the Economy, Stupid." *Migration Information Source*. http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=783.

Macalou, Badara Aliou. 2009. "Creating Partnerships with Diasporas: The Malian Experience." In *Closing the distance: how governments strengthen ties with their diasporas*, ed. Dovelyn Rannveig Agunias. Migration Policy Institute.

Mainwaring, Scott. 2003. "Introduction: Democratic Accountability in Latin America." In *Democratic accountability in Latin America*, eds. Christopher Welna and Scott Mainwaring. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mainwaring, Scott, and Christopher Welna, eds. 2003. *Democratic accountability in Latin America*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Manin, Bernard, Adam Przeworski, and Susan Stokes. 1999. "Elections and Representation." In *Democracy, accountability, and representation*, eds. Adam Przeworski and Stokes. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Marshall, Monty, and Keith Jaggers. 2009. "Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2009." http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm.

Mohan, Giles. 2008. "Making neoliberal states of development: the Ghanaian diaspora and the politics of homelands." *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 26(3): 464 – 479.

Nelson, Joan. 1987. "Political Participation." In *Understanding political development: an analytic study*, eds. Myron Weiner, Samuel P. Huntington, and Gabriel Abraham Almond. Boston: Little, Brown.

Nieswand, Boris. 2009. "Development and Diaspora: Ghana and its Migrants." *Sociologus* 59(1): 17-31.

O'Donnell, Guillermo. 1994. "Delegative democracy." *Journal of democracy* 5: 55–55.

———. 1998. "Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies." *Journal of Democracy* 9(3): 112-126.

O'Mahoney, Angela. 2009. *Political Investment: Remittances and Elections*. Toronto, ON, Canada. Paper prepared for 2009 Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Toronto, Canada. September 3-6, 2009.

Orozco, Manuel, and Rebecca Rouse. 2007. "Migrant Hometown Associations and Opportunities for Development: A Global Perspective." *Migration Information Source*.

Osaghae, Eghosa E. 1999. "Exiting from the State in Nigeria." *African Journal of Political Science* 4(1): 83-98.

Osmani, S.R. 2002. *Expanding Voice and Accountability Through the Budgetary Process*. New York, NY: UNDP. Background paper for HDR 2002.

Oxhorn, Philip. 1995. *Organizing civil society: the popular sectors and the struggle for democracy in Chile*. University Park: Penn State Press.

Di Palma, Giuseppe. 1970. *Apathy and participation: mass politics in Western societies*. New York: Free Press.

Pérez-Armendáriz, Clarisa, and David Crow. 2010. "Do Migrants Remit Democracy? International Migration, Political Beliefs, and Behavior in Mexico." *Comparative Political Studies* 43(1): 119 -148.

Peruzzotti, Enrique, and Catalina Smulovitz. 2006. *Enforcing the rule of law: social accountability in the new Latin American democracies*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Pessar, Patricia R, and Sarah J Mahler. 2003. "Transnational Migration: Bringing Gender In." *International Migration Review* 37(3): 812-846.

Pfaff, Steven, and Hyojoung Kim. 2003. "Exit–Voice Dynamics in Collective Action: An Analysis of Emigration and Protest in the East German Revolution." *American Journal of Sociology* 109(2): 401-444.

Piore, Michael J. 1980. *Birds of Passage: Migrant Labor and Industrial Societies*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Piore, Michael J., and Charles F. Sabel. 1984. *The second industrial divide: possibilities for prosperity*. New York: Basic Books.

Portes, Alejandro. 2003. "Conclusion: Theoretical Convergencies and Empirical Evidence in the Study of Immigrant Transnationalism." *International Migration Review* 37(3): 874-892.

Portes, Alejandro, Cristina Escobar, and Alexandria Walton Radford. 2007. "Immigrant Transnational Organizations and Development: A Comparative Study1." *International Migration Review* 41(1): 242-281.

Portes, Alejandro, Luis Guarnizo, and Patricia Landolt. 1999. "The study of transnationalism: pitfalls and promise of an emergent research field." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 22(2): 217-237.

Pozo, Susan. 2005. "On Remittances and Risk." In *Beyond small change: making migrant remittances count*, ed. Donald F. Terry. Washington, DC: IDB.

Przeworski, Adam, Susan Stokes, and Bernard Manin, eds. 1999. *Democracy, accountability, and representation*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Ratha, Dilip. 2007. *Leveraging Remittances for Development*. Prepared for Second Plenary Meeting of the Leading Group on Solidarity Levies to Fund Development, Oslo, Norway.

Roberts, Kenneth M. 1998. *Deepening democracy?: the modern left and social movements in Chile and Peru*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Rother, Stefan. 2009. “Changed in Migration? Philippine Return Migrants and (Un)Democratic Remittances.” *European Journal of East Asian Studies* 8(2): 245-274.

Rüland, Jürgen, Christl Kessler, and Stefan Rother. 2009. “Democratisation Through International Migration? Explorative Thoughts on a Novel Research Agenda.” *European Journal of East Asian Studies* 8(2): 161-179.

Sassen, Saskia. 1998. *Globalization and its discontents*. New York: New Press.

———. 1990. *The Mobility of Labor and Capital: A Study in International Investment and Labor Flow*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Schedler, Andreas. 1999. “Conceptualizing Accountability.” In *The self-restraining state: power and accountability in new democracies*, eds. Andreas Schedler, Larry Jay Diamond, and Marc F. Plattner. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Scott, James C. 1985. *Weapons of the weak: everyday forms of peasant resistance*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Van Selm, Joanne. 2007. “Macedonia: At a Quiet Crossroads.” *Migration Information Source*. http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=608.

Skeldon, Ronald. 2008. “International Migration as a Tool in Development Policy: A Passing Phase?” *Population and Development Review* 34(1): 1-18.

Smith, Michael P., and Matt Bakker. 2008. *Citizenship across borders: the political transnationalism of el migrante*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Smith, William C. 2009. *Latin American democratic transformations: institutions, actors, and processes*. Malden, MA: John Wiley and Sons.

Smulovitz, Catalina, and Enrique Peruzzotti. 2003. “Societal and Horizontal Controls: Two Cases of a Fruitful Relationship.” In *Democratic accountability in Latin America*, eds. Scott Mainwaring and Christopher Welna. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 309-331.

Solimano, Andrés. 2010. *International Migration in the Age of Crisis and Globalization: Historical and Recent Experiences*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Solomon, M. Scott. 2009. “State-led Migration, Democratic Legitimacy, and Deterritorialization: The Philippines’ labour export model.” *European Journal of East Asian Studies* 8(2): 275-300.

Stokes, Susan. 2005. “Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina.” *American Political Science Review* 99(03): 315-325.

Tulchin, Joseph S., and Amelia Brown. 2002. *Democratic governance and social inequality*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

UNCTAD. 2002. "Increase in the productivity gap between LDCs and other developing countries." http://www.unctad.org/templates/Page.asp?intItemID=4078&lang=1 (Accessed February 2, 2010).

UNDP. 2009. *Human Development Report 2009: Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and Development*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

UNHCR. various. *Statistical Yearbook*. Geneva: United Nations High Commission on Refugees.

Vengroff, Richard. 2007. "Senegal: a significant external electorate." In *Voting from Abroad*, The International IDEA Handbook Series, Stockholm and Mexico City: Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance; Instituto Federal Electoral, p. 104-107.

Verba, Sidney, Norman H. Nie, and Jae-on Kim. 1987. *Participation and political equality: a seven-nation comparison*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Villalón, Leonardo Alfonso, and Peter VonDoepp. 2005. *The fate of Africa's democratic experiments: elites and institutions*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Waldinger, Roger, and Nelson Lim. 2009. *Connectivity and Collectivity: Immigrant Involvement in Homeland Politics*. Unpublished paper. Unpublished paper.

Wampler, Brian. 2007. *Participatory budgeting in Brazil: contestation, cooperation, and accountability*. University Park: Penn State Press.

Wampler, Brian, Maria Chávez, and Nicholas De Genova. 2009. "Should I Stay or Should I Go? Explaining Why Most Mexican Immigrants are Choosing to Remain Permanently in the United States." *Latino Studies* 7(1): 83-104.

Watkins, Callie. 2010. "Beyond Remittances: Sustainable Diaspora Contributions and Development in Cape Verde, West Africa." MA Thesis. Department of Regional Planning, Cornell University.

Weyland, Kurt Gerhard. 2004. "Neoliberalism and Democracy in Latin America: A Mixed Record." *Latin American Politics & Society* 46(1): 135-157.

Wood, Elisabeth Jean. 2000. *Forging democracy from below: insurgent transitions in South Africa and El Salvador*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

World Bank. 2010a. *Bilateral Migration and Remittances 2010*. Washington, DC: World Bank. http://uc.cx.sl.pt (Accessed September 9, 2011).

———. 2011. *Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

———. 2010b. *World development indicators*. Washington, DC: World Bank Publications.

Wright, Joseph. 2010. *Exit During Crisis: How Openness, Migration, and Economic Crisis Affect Democratization*. Working Paper #367, Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame.