Elster vs. Elster

It was a delight to have Jon Elster, a scholar of the highest stature, here at CIDE.  One thing that left me puzzled during his lectures, however, was that his methodological views seemed to be very different when he considered the status of social science in general, than the framework he actually applied in his own research. For instance, in his paper on the excessive ambitions of social science, Jon Elster criticizes both, rational choice models and statistical analysis. These are some notable quotations:

Cohorts after cohort of students are learning –and many of them subsequently hired to apply or teach– useless theories. Their efforts and talents would have been vastly more useful to society had they been harnessed to more productive purposes.

Rational-choice models may (…) help us explain, predict or shape behavior. Although simple and robust models may do this in a rough-and-ready sense, the sophisticated models that are the pride of the profession do not.

My claim is that much work in economics and political science is devoid of empirical, aesthetic or mathematical interest, which means that it has no value at all. I cannot make any quantitative assessment of the proportion of work in leading journals that fall in this category. I am firmly convinced, however, that the proportion is non-negligible and important enough to constitute something of a scandal.

I suggest that a non-negligible part of empirical social science consists of half-understood statistical theory applied to half-assimilated empirical material (the emphasis is Elster’s).

If many applications of rational-choice theory and statistical theory are wasteful or harmful, why do they persist? (…) I shall discuss two possible mechanisms: mind-binding and pluralistic ignorance.

Controversial (excessive?) as they may be, let’s assume that the jury is out on the above assertions. On the other hand, Elster’s paper on democracy and justice discusses the issues of compulsory voting and turnout under a rational choice framework, backed up with cross-country statistical evidence (the emphasis in what follows is mine):

As I just argued, it would be a danger sign if a large majority of the citizens chose not to exercise their right to vote. And in fact, why should they exercise it? The cost of voting, although small, is not zero. The benefit of voting, if measured by the chance of casting the decisive vote, is essentially zero. (…) modern game theory can be used to show that his conclusion is correct. If voters are rational and self-interested, only a small number will vote.

(…) compulsory voting might trigger a norm of fairness, in the following sense. (…) When voting is made compulsory, their estimate of the likelihood that others will vote goes up, and hence they are more likely to vote as well.  The alternative explanation is that the fear of sanctions provides a full account of the higher turnout under compulsory voting. In general, these sanctions are not severe and enforcement levels are low. Yet from an expected-utility point of view, even a small perceived risk of a small fine for non-voting might exceed the small cost of voting. Also, voters might not know how small the risk is, and they might not be rationally motivated to find out.

To my knowledge, there has been no systematic attempt to find out whether the effects of compulsory voting are due mainly to a stronger feeling of civic duty induced by the law or mainly to the deterrence effect of sanctions. I suspect that cost-benefit analysis fails to capture the psychology of voting, but I have no clear and clean alternative explanation to propose.

I want to pursue some further implications of the fact that voting is a collective action problem. To overcome a free-rider problem, institutional designers may use either the stick or the carrot – punish non-compliers or reward compliers.

The important point is that the requirement of compulsory voting tends to have two distinct effects. On the one hand, it consolidates democracy, by increasing turnout. On the other hand, it promotes justice, by improving the match between the outcome of elections and the popular will. When voting is voluntary, poor citizens are somewhat less likely to vote than the better-off. The tendency varies across countries, and is not always very strong, but it can be substantial. The impact of education on voting is even more substantial. In addition to findings by political scientists, evidence in favor of the correlation is provided by the strong resistance of right-wing parties to compulsory voting, as well as to many measures intended to facilitate voluntary voting.

So, the question is, which version of Jon Elster are we supposed to believe?

Aprobación presidencial y agenda legislativa

La popularidad presidencial siempre es un buen tema de conversación pero no es muy claro cuáles son sus implicaciones en el proceso político (más allá de lo electoral).  El Universal de hoy, 20 de septiembre de 2009, publica su más reciente encuesta de evaluación presidencial y me solicitaron comentarla.  Pueden ver mi artículo aquí o líneas abajo. Algunas de mis columnas previas en El Universal están reunidas aquí y aquí (o bien den click a la categoría México a su derecha).

Aprobación presidencial y agenda legislativa

En la opinión de mucha gente el responsable último de buen o mal rumbo del país es el presidente de la República. Por ello, cuando la economía va por mal camino, los presidentes y sus partidos pierden fuerza y tienden a perder el poder, y viceversa. De acuerdo a la más reciente encuesta sobre desempeño presidencial, levantada por Berumen y Asociados entre el 11 y 13 de septiembre pasado, 55% de la población en edad de votar aprueba algo o mucho el trabajo de Felipe Calderón.  Esta cifra revela un declive importante respecto su nivel máximo de aprobación, de 68%, conseguido en abril de 2007. Por otro lado, 71% de los encuestados opina que las cosas han empeorado en México en el último año, y no les falta razón pues la caída del PIB para este año será mayor al 6%. 

Ante la severidad de la crisis económica, ¿por qué no ha caído tanto la popularidad del presidente, como ha sucedido en otros momentos?  Expertos en el tema, como Leo Zuckermann, han apuntado que el gobierno de Calderón ha logrado persuadir a la opinión pública de que la “crisis vino de fuera” y, por otro lado, la guerra contra el crimen organizado le ha dado buenos rendimientos al presidente.  Esta estrategia de imagen parece haber funcionado hasta ahora, pero no debe sorprendernos que, eventualmente, el “premio al esfuerzo de guerra” de Calderón se diluya y su popularidad caiga aún más.

La popularidad presidencial a menudo tiene efectos asimétricos: un presidente impopular le puede costar votos a su partido, como le ocurrió a Zedillo en 1997, o a Bush en 2008. Pero la buena imagen de un presidente no necesariamente se traduce en más votos para su partido: la popularidad de Fox y Calderón sirvieron de poco al PAN en sus respectivas elecciones intermedias.  Contra lo que muchos piensan, el efecto de los medios y las campañas es bastante moderado: aunque la campaña del PAN se centró en la imagen del presidente y el tema de seguridad, los votantes no tuvieron ningún reparo en castigar a este partido por los malos resultados económicos.

¿Qué otras consecuencias tiene la buena o mala administración del capital político del presidente?  Una muy relevante en estos momentos es la capacidad de negociación de la agenda legislativa del ejecutivo.  Junto con el amargo paquete económico para 2010, el presidente anunció una ambiciosa serie de reformas estructurales. ¿Por qué hasta ahora? Los estudios sobre el tema sugieren que siempre es más sencillo impulsar grandes reformas al inicio del mandato—cuando la oposición está desorganizada, el presidente cuenta con un notable apoyo popular y hay tiempo suficiente para diluir los costos iniciales y capitalizar sus resultados de mediano plazo.  Hacerlo a medio camino es mucho más difícil porque los costos políticos y electorales son sumamente elevados.  Por otro lado, por lo general es más sencillo reformar en tiempos de crisis, como los que vivimos ahora, toda vez que los costos de no hacer nada superan los costos políticos antes mencionados.  Y reformar en tiempos de crisis tiene otra consecuencia: de aprobarse, el partido que las impulsa tiende a perder en la siguiente elección.

Tanto Fox como Calderón cometieron un error similar: ambos presentaron una agenda legislativa moderada durante su primer trienio. Su apuesta parece haber sido, primero, consolidar su mandato sin mayores conflictos con el Congreso y, posteriormente, tratar de conseguir una mayoría legislativa en la elección intermedia que les permitiera empujar las reformas estructurales que habían prometido en sus campañas.  Fox decidió no enfrentar al PRI y nunca arriesgó su popularidad. Calderón postergó su agenda de reformas a pesar de que su principal adversario, López Obrador, prácticamente se había inmolado y el PRI estaba débil y fragmentado. 

A Zedillo le tocó iniciar su sexenio con una crisis económica, con niveles de aprobación ínfimos, y se vio obligado a introducir reformas y a hacer ajustes dolorosos con el apoyo del PAN. El electorado pasó factura al PRI tanto en 1997 como en 2000. Paradójicamente, Zedillo dejó la presidencia con niveles de aprobación del 70%. Hoy a Calderón le toca impulsar reformas en medio de una crisis económica y con una aprobación modesta pero en declive. Es posible que el PRI lo apoye en algunas iniciativas, sobre todo en aquellas que le den mayores réditos (como transferencias a estados y control del gasto social) e impliquen mayores costos al PAN (como mayores impuestos).  De nuevo, la factura llegará en 2012.

Política industrial y crecimiento económico

Esta semana el Banco Mundial organizó un panel sobre “Política industrial y el papel del estado en la promoción del crecimiento económico“.  Los papers de Harrison y Lin no tienen desperdicio alguno y son lectura recomendada para todos aquellos en busca de “modelos alternativos de desarrollo”. 

Bill Easterly resume la discusión aquí y ofrece su propio bottomline:  “Does a poor country government have a comparative advantage in discovering a poor country’s comparative advantage? A corrupt, low-skilled, poorly-funded government does not have a comparative advantage in finding the country’s comparative advantage.”

Por su lado, el paper de Harrison y Rodriguez sugiere que:

While the literature on trade and growth linkages faces many challenging problems, we suggest two general lessons that may be drawn from the voluminous evidence. First, there was no signicant relationship in the second half of the twentieth century between average protection levels and growth. Second, there is a positive association between trade volumes and growth. We interpret the lack of a signicant association between average tariffs and growth, combined with the strong relationship between trade shares and growth, to suggest that any successful Industrial Policy strategy must ultimately increase the share of international trade in GDP. The fact that so many countries have been unsuccessful in o¤setting the anti-trade bias of their interventions may explain why so many have failed to succeed at Industrial Policy.

Industrial Policy and The Role of the State in Promoting Growth

William Easterly- New York University and NBER
Ann Harrison – Research Manager, Development Research Group, The World Bank
Justin Yifu Lin – Chief Economist and Senior Vice President, The World Bank

The papers are available as one file in zip format, or here:

Our built-in expiration date

From the Gravity and Levity blog, a nice lesson in statistics, fitting data to density functions, and the probability of living and dying:

Your body wasn’t built to last: a lesson from human mortality rates

What do you think are the odds that you will die during the next year?  Try to put a number to it — 1 in 100?  1 in 10,000?  Whatever it is, it will be twice as large 8 years from now.

This startling fact was first noticed by the British actuary Benjamin Gompertz in 1825 and is now called the “Gompertz Law of human mortality.”  Your probability of dying during a given year doubles every 8 years.  For me, a 25-year-old American, the probability of dying during the next year is 0.03% — about 1 in 3,000.  When I’m 42 it will be about 1 in 750, and so on.  By the time I reach age 100 the probability of living to 101 will only be about 0.5%.  This is seriously fast growth — my mortality rate is increasing exponentially with age.

And if my mortality rate (the probability of dying during the next year) is rising exponentially, that means that the probability of me surviving to a particular age is falling super-exponentially.

Read the whole thing here (including nice graphs!). And here is a beautiful death probability calculator :-).

El paquete fiscal 2010

El pasado jueves 10 de septiembre de 2009 tuve una entrevista con Javier Solórzano, en Radio Trece, sobre el paquete económico y fiscal para 2010 en México, presentado esta semana por el Secretario de Hacienda ante el Congreso.  Este tema merece una más detallada atención, pero pueden escuchar mis primeras reacciones aquí.

Como antecedente, el 8 de enero de 2009 tuve otra entrevista con Javier Solórzano sobre el llamado “plan anticrisis” que anunció Felipe Calderón al inicio del año. Pueden escucharla aquí.

En las próximas semanas escucharemos mucho sobre este tema. La Ley de Ingresos para 2010 debe ser aprobada por ambas Cámaras, mientras que el Presupuesto de Egresos solamente requiere la aprobación de la Cámara de Diputados. Esto es importante porque el PAN puede sostener un veto presidencial en el Senado pero, dado el resultado electoral de julio pasado, no podría hacerlo en la cámara baja.

Are economists evil?

This is Paul Krugman in the New York Times Magazine (september 6, 2009):

How Did Economists Get It So Wrong?

I. MISTAKING BEAUTY FOR TRUTH

It’s hard to believe now, but not long ago economists were congratulating themselves over the success of their field. Those successes — or so they believed — were both theoretical and practical, leading to a golden era for the profession. On the theoretical side, they thought that they had resolved their internal disputes. Thus, in a 2008 paper titled “The State of Macro” (that is, macroeconomics, the study of big-picture issues like recessions), Olivier Blanchard of M.I.T., now the chief economist at the International Monetary Fund, declared that “the state of macro is good.” The battles of yesteryear, he said, were over, and there had been a “broad convergence of vision.” And in the real world, economists believed they had things under control: the “central problem of depression-prevention has been solved,” declared Robert Lucas of the University of Chicago in his 2003 presidential address to the American Economic Association. In 2004, Ben Bernanke, a former Princeton professor who is now the chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, celebrated the Great Moderation in economic performance over the previous two decades, which he attributed in part to improved economic policy making.

Last year, everything came apart.

Few economists saw our current crisis coming, but this predictive failure was the least of the field’s problems. More important was the profession’s blindness to the very possibility of catastrophic failures in a market economy. During the golden years, financial economists came to believe that markets were inherently stable — indeed, that stocks and other assets were always priced just right. There was nothing in the prevailing models suggesting the possibility of the kind of collapse that happened last year. Meanwhile, macroeconomists were divided in their views. But the main division was between those who insisted that free-market economies never go astray and those who believed that economies may stray now and then but that any major deviations from the path of prosperity could and would be corrected by the all-powerful Fed. Neither side was prepared to cope with an economy that went off the rails despite the Fed’s best efforts.

And in the wake of the crisis, the fault lines in the economics profession have yawned wider than ever. Lucas says the Obama administration’s stimulus plans are “schlock economics,” and his Chicago colleague John Cochrane says they’re based on discredited “fairy tales.” In response, Brad DeLong of the University of California, Berkeley, writes of the “intellectual collapse” of the Chicago School, and I myself have written that comments from Chicago economists are the product of a Dark Age of macroeconomics in which hard-won knowledge has been forgotten.

What happened to the economics profession? And where does it go from here?

You can read the whole thing here.   These are other viewpoints on the same question:

A quick and perhaps defensive reaction: and are there any non-economists who got it right?  Did any politician/historian/philospher got it right? Who should we turn now for financial and economic advice? In my view, if this debate boils down to reloaded Keynesians vs. neo-neoclassicals, it seems like the economics profession remains mostly unchallenged (for better or worse).

Toronto / APSA 2009

This weekend I will be attending the American Political Science Association Annual Conference, in Toronto, 3-6 September 2009. These are the abstracts of the papers that we will deliver.

The Political Economy of Collective Remittances: The Mexican 3×1 Program for Migrants

Javier Aparicio and Covadonga Meseguer

 Abstract.  The 3×1 Program for Migrants (Programa 3×1 para migrantes) is a matching grant scheme that seeks to direct the money sent by migrant organizations abroad to the provision of public and social infrastructure, and to productive projects in migrants’ communities of origin. To do so, the municipal, state, and federal governments match the amount sent by hometown associations at a 3 to 1 rate. We explore the types of projects awarded to assess whether the program is subject to political manipulation. Following the literature on redistributive politics, we posit that an increase in competition in municipal races may lead to more private (or clientelistic) projects awarded, relative to public infrastructure ones. Using data on the 3×1 Program for Migrants for over 2,400 municipalities in the 2002 to 2007 period, we find that municipalities with a higher effective number of political parties are associated with a lower provision of public goods funded by the 3×1 program. These results cast doubts about the program efficacy in promoting public welfare in politically competitive locations with high migration levels.

 

Committee Leadership Selection without Seniority: The Mexican Case

Javier Aparicio and Joy Langston

Abstract. How are committee leaders in legislatures chosen absent seniority norms?  This paper argues that the prior political experience of legislators can serve as cues to caucus leaders to reduce adverse selection in a legislature where seniority cannot be the basis of allocating committee leadership posts because of single term limits. We assess whether differences in background and expertise have any effect on the likelihood of leading major, issue, or duty panels in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies elected between 1997 and 2006. Using a dataset of 1,391 federal deputies, we estimate the effect of the level (federal, state or local) and type (legislative, bureaucratic or party) of their prior expertise on committee leadership. Using Bayesian multinomial logit models, we find that well educated legislators with bureaucratic expertise are more likely to lead a major committee than those with prior legislative or other national level expertise. We find mixed evidence for so-called state governor loyalists.